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ABS'rRACT 
Infofmat~on and access to it, is a vital ingredient 
in the democratic model. Government secrecy however inhi-
bits the flow of information to citizens. This denial of 
fu.11 and accurate information stunts. and weakens public 
debate. 
The Official Secrets Act by it's existance and 
intent, helps to perpetuate official secrecy. It is a 
vauge_Act of illdefined meanings, and grants wide powers 
of arrest and conviction, powers which can be used at 
the discretion of a government. It has dangerous poten-
. t:i,.al as a discreti.onary political weapon, and could be 
employed to silence or harass critics. 
Reform of the Act is a necessary part of any 
programme designed to reverse the trend to official secrecy 
and to bring about more open government.· However, reform 
_takes time and effort an_d may not always be successful. 
It requires ~ither exclusion of the executive from the 
reform process, or sustained public opinion pressure to 
force a government or a potential government to reform 
the secrecy system. 
In New Zealand there is a rising expectation 
that citizens are entitled to know what a government 
is doing, but it.is not at a level that will ensure 
significant reform of government secrecy and the 
Official Secrets Act.-
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In peace and in war, some of the activities 
of a modern state must be conducted in ·secret. 1 
So reads the editorial in the· New ·z·e·a-i-a·nd He·rald 
for 3 November 1951, the occasion being the first reading 
of the Offici&l Secrets Bill. These sentiments are per-
haps accepted as much by the governors and the governed 
of today as they were during the difficult and disturbed 
year of 1951. 
The statement, however, demonstrates much more. 
It alludes to the situation where the citizen must trust 
the government on matters of which it has no knowledge. 2 
... 
It declares. that secrecy has a place in government,· not 
only during times of security threat, but also during 
periods of calm. More importantly, it is vague and 
undefinitive. · Of course no-one expects precision about 
such a subject in the space of an editorial column. 
However, this absence of explicitness in defining secrecy 
- what should be kept secret, for how long, for what rea-
sons, by what authority - pervades the whole area of 
1 . 
New Zealand Herald, Editorial, 3 November 1951, 
p. 8. 
2This is highlighted in the c_ase of the recent expul-
sion of the Soviet Ambassador, Sofinsky, where the Prime 
Minister kept secret the details o; the 5 •!-S· action and 
· the evidence, saying that the public must trust the 
system". The Press, 30 January 1980, P• l. 
~l 
2 
information in a democracy. 
Few people have clear and explicit ideas about the 
definition df what should and should not be kept secret. 
This is perhaps a product of the subject itself, but 
inevitably those who are lucid about secrecy are contra-
dictory, not only with one another but also with those 
who are less clear about the security of information. 
This clash manifests itself in the disagreement 
between the traditional side of secrecy, that is the. 
government, and the freedom·of information campaigners. 
At the same time both groups are divided amongst them-
selves about the correct course of action. This is to 
be expected where human beings, each one unique with his 
or her own interests, are discussing a matter of political 
importance. 
The problem is, nevertheless, a tangled and complex 
· one. Not only are the freedom of information advocates 
multifarious in their views, but the official position, 
embodied in the law of the land, favours generality 
instead of precision and detail. 
The imprecision is more than a simple problem of 
comprehension. The fact that an important concept such 
as secrecy is left ambiguous means it is open to inter~ 
pretation, and interpretation means inconsistency. This 
point is important and will be discussed in due course, 
when the New Zealand Official Secrets Act is considered. 
This Act can be seen as a manifestation or a pro-
duct of the practice of official secrecy. As such, it is 
a symbol of the whole system, an obvious target in the 
debate on information and secrecy. It has become the 
centre-piece in the battle for freedom of information. 
3 
The fact that there is pressure for reform is 
recognition that there is a problem, an anomaly, that 
part of the system is no longer necessary or desirable. 
In this respect, nearly every individual or group that 
supports reform, sees official secrecy as undemocratic, 
and the Act as epitomising the depreciation of democracy. 
This situation provides the study with a focus and 
a definition of the problem. 
Why is the Official Secrets Act regarded as un-
democratic, and what attempts are being made to 
change the situation? 
If this question is answered initially in a, hypothetical 
manner, by making certain suggestions as to the possible 
state of affairs and then testing these suggestions 
against the practice, the conclusions drawn will enable 
a clearer understanding of the problem. 
The propositions of this thesis are: 
1. That democratic theory regards information as 
important in a political system. 
2. That official secrecy is in some senses contra-
dictory to this theory. 
3. That the Official Secrets Act, by its existence 
and its operation, is undemocratic. 
4. That reform is necessary to reconcile practice 
with democratic theory. 
S. That because the Act is u nd emocratic, and there 
is pressure for cha:11ge, reform will occur. 
4 
These propositions suggest an explicit pattern of 
research. Firstly, a discussion of democratic theory and 
the democrat\ic m'odel in New Zealand and the importance 
of information. Secondly, a description and analysis of 
the practice of official secrecy in general, the reasons 
and excuses for it, and whether the reality may or may 
not be contradictory to the theory. Thirdly, a detailed 
descriptive analysis of the Official Secrets Act, how it 
came into being, what it does, how it has been used, and 
what its implications are for democracy. Fourthly, an 
account of the process of reform, initially in other 
countries and then concentrating on the New Zealand situ-
ation, looking at past attempts and present efforts. 
Fifthly, by evaluating the status of the Act and the moves 
for change, to offer some conclusions about how reform 
will occur, and to what extent. 
The first task ;is, then, information and democrat-
ic theory. 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY, SECRECY AND THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMA,TION 
Democratic conventions and ideals, while remaining 
amorphous and largely unexplored in the minds of most 
citizens, still constitute the basis of our society. The 
fact that these conventions and ideals remain vague and 
shapeless can be partially attributed to the situation 
where there is no democratic theory, only theories~1 
1 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic• Theory 
(Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 1. 
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Thus when a concise definition of 'democratic theory' 
becomes necessary to.the understanding of particular 
political institutions and phenomena of a_ given society, 
the task is indeed immense. 
Nevertheless, a central core runs through these 
theories: that government should be conducted in the inter-
ests of all the people, and that it should be limited and 
1 
controlled by the people, These concepts are originally 
based in the deep mistrust of governments. As Jefferson 
noted, 
Sometimes, it is said that man cannot be trusted 
with the government of Himself. Can he then be 
trusted with the government of others? 2 
This being the case, there are many methods, depending 
on the political system~ that the citizens of a society 
employ to carry out the important task of lL~itation and 
control. 
In New Zealand these controls,· as outli~ed by 
Dicey, are two-fold~ Firstly, the control of government 
by Parliament and secondly, the control of Pa.rliament by 
. 3 
the electorate. It is almost trite political science to 
suggest that these controls no longer operate in the way 
Dicey envisaged,. if they ever did.. The exercise, however 
is not to discuss the operation of the democratic method 
in New Zealand as such, but to isolate and describe the 
1 Keith Ovenden, "Reaffirming the Anglo-American Demo ... 
cratic Ideal," in· nn·p·rov·ing New ·z·e·aTa·nd' s· Deilfo·cra·cy, ·J. 
Stephen Hoadley, ed. (Auckland : New Zealand Foundation 
for Peace Stduies, 1979}, p. 18. 
2Thomas Jefferson, quoted in O. John Rogge, 'lTfie 
Right to Know, 11 • The· Ailfe:ri·can· Scholar, Vol~ 41 · (1972}, p. 
643 ~ 
3oavid Baragwanath, "Reducing Secrecy in Government, n 
in Hoadley,· pp· ·cit., p. 59 •. 
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importance of information in the practice of this method. 
Thus the question is posed: are the secretive 
-,. ·,'.~ 
\ ' 
practices of a government contradictory to the ideals of 
democratic theory? Even a cursory glance at democratic 
literature tells us that the answer.must be "yesu. To 
justify this answer one must turn to the three sentinels 
of limitation and control: representative government; the 
Rule of Law; and public opinion. 1 In each case the free 
flow of information is seen in theory to be vital to one 
degree or another in the upholding of democratic ideals~ 
REPRESENTATION 
The reality of representative government has, in 
modern society, replaced the old and now redundant ideal 
of direct democracy .. Full, open and frank discussion about 
the issues of the day are seen as important elements in 
I 
the election of these representatives. 
Infonnation, however, can be seen as generally sup-
erfluous to the actual casting of a vote. Although some 
argue to the contrary, suggesting that the elector must 
have facts in order to exercise sound judgement on the 
conduct and merits of the candidates and thus cast an 
2 intelligent and rational vote, many are more sceptical. 
Joseph Schumpeter claims, in fact, that information is 
plentiful and readily available (writing in the United 
States in 1942) but that the vast majority of citizens 
1 0venden,· op· cit., pp. 18-22. 
2Enid Campbell, "Public Access to Government Documents, 
Australian L·aw Journ·a1, Vol. 41, 31 July 1967, p. 74. 
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are not trained in the digestion and application of know-
ledge. Therefore, he suggests, ignorance will persist in 
\ 
the face of masses of information and that irrationality 
will remain a feature of the political system. 1 
Alternatively, even if an elector did have the 
capacity to analyse the information he received, the 
large amount of time and effort needed for that analysis, 
so as to cast a sensible vote, would simply be a waste of 
resources .. This, for the simple reason that in the mass 
electorates of today his vote is unlikely to be important 
in the outcome. 2 
There is the possibility, however, _that where an 
elected representative has acted in an improper or 
illegal manner, official. secrecy: may protect him or her, 
and thus prevent the public from discovering that this 
person was unfit to govern. Certainly this type of secret 
shroud was used to protect Richard Nixon and helped him 
to stay in office, more than two years after the Watergate 
scandal broke. Therefore, freedom of information may not 
be so crucial in the normal selection of representatives, 
' but it may be vital in the dismissal of unsuitable or 
unscrupulous office holders. 
THE RULE OF LAW 
A second bulwark against tyranny in a democracy is 
the rule of law, the central theme being that government 
1 Joseph A. Schumpeter ,- Capita1i·sm ,- Social•ism• a·nd 
· Democracy Fourth Edition (New York : Harper Brothers, 
19 4 2) , p. 2 61 • 
, 2arian Barry, Political· Argument (London : Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 270. · 
8 
in~titutions should be constructed in such a way so as to 
require governments to control themselves. This is done 
. \ 
either through a system of checks and. balances or by a 
constitution, or both.1 However, with the rapid economic, 
social and political development since the· nineteenth 
century, a complex and difficult problem has aris~n, 
hampering the implementation of these controls. That is 
reconciling efficient executive_ government with the desire 
· for democratic control. 2 In a political and economic 
system needing rapid and efficient decision-making, the 
slower more deliberate method of ·deciding courses of action, 
as practiced by representative assemblies, is often by-
passed -and supplanted by an increasingly powerful executive .• 
This is a major problem, threateni~g the continued 
practice of the democratic method. The threat is perhaps 
more pronounced in New Zealand than elsewhere. Even in 
theory, no meaningful system (such as in the United States) 
of checks and balances exists._ Dicey• s two-fold theory of 
democratic control, as outlined above, is perhaps the 
nearest we come to checks on the executive. However, the 
growth of complex societal and economic:: systems·, coupled 
with strong party discipline and the lack of public know-
ledge, ·has to a large degree rendered this theory redund-. 
ant. 
At the same time the rule of law not only invovles 
checks and balances but also implies an assurance on 
1 ovenden, op cit._, pp. 19-20. 
2oavid Williaxns, · Not i·n· the Puhl-ic• Intei:.-e·st ·:· The· 
Problem of Security i·n· ·a· Democracy (London : Hutch1nson, 
1965), p. 9. 
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behalf of the state that the citizen has equal access to 
legal recourse before the courts, and that these courts 
\ 
should be free from political intervention. Although the 
New Zealand system could not be described as perfect, no-
one would suggest that these cond'itions do not exist in 
this country. However, in the case of information and 
secrecy, it can be asserted that the rule of law does not 
always operate in the favour of the citizen. Under the 
Otficial Secrets Act; for instance, the requirement that 
a defendant be innocent until proven_ guilty has, in effect, 
1 been reversed. · Also, the decision to prosecute under 
this Act is left to the discretion of the Attorney--
General, a politician. 
To take.these two anomalies at face value then, 
the rule of law as envisaged in democratic theory, would 
seem to have been usurped in the face of government 
secrecy. The9e points will be explored later, _in Chapter 
Four, but it is worth noting at this point as the ideals 
of the democratic model are examined, where the practice 
is likely to deviate from the theory. 
The maintenance of the rule of law is seen to be 
1 official Secrets Act 1951, section 7. "On p~osecu-
tion under·this Act, if, from the circumstances of the 
case, or the conduct of the accused person, or his known 
character as proved, it appears that his purpose was 
prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state, it 
shall be deemed that his purpose was such a purpose, unless 
the contrary is proved ••• if any sketch ••• or inform-
ation relating ••• to a prohibited place or any secret 
password is collected ••. or communicated (without author-
ization) it shall be deemed to have been collected .•. 
or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety 
or interests of the state, unless the contrary is proved." 
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dependen~ on two fa?tors, particularly in New Zealand's 
case, where few truly fo:anal checks exist to ensure the 
liberty· of the c•itizen. One is· ensuring that the mechan-
ics of legal redress are independent of politicians, and 
the other, that the conduct of government should receive 
. 1 
the undivided attention of the people. 
If the former is only partially fulfilled (as 
perhaps in the case·of government_secrecy) then the role 
of the latter becomes that much more .important.. It 
involves not simply the silent observation of_ government, 
but meticulous scrutiny, culminating in the expressive 
pressure of public opinion. Herein lies the third sent-
inel of limitation and control. 
INFORM..ATION AND PUBLIC Ol?INION 
Despite the cha!ges in recent years, tha,t_ govern-
ment is taking less notice of public needs and wishes, 
public opinion can be seen as a very real sanction on the· 
power of the government. 2 This sanction achieves a h~gh 
measure of control in several distinct ways, _each in part 
I 
dependent on the availability of information about_ govern-
ment activities for its effectiveness • 
. In the first instance, governments depend on the 
consent of the people to remain in office. That is, if 
they constantly offend the people they will lose office 
at an election. A,s Enid Campbell notes, certain conditions 
1ovenden,· ol_:>' cit. ,. p. 21 .. 
2Keith ·Jackson,· New ·ze·at·a·n-a ·:· PoTitic•s· c>"f· Cha·nge 
(Wellington.: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1973), p. 153. 
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need to apply for tnis mechanism to function properly: 
It is common ground that in a society which . 
professes .to be democratic, citizens ought to 
be informed about what their government is doing. 
Citizens have a right to decide by whom and by 
what rules they shall be governed, and are entitled 
to call on those who govern on their behalf to 
account for their conduct~ 1 
If a government loses consent when it is called to account, 
then the country becomes ungovernable by that administra-
tion. Information, however, is seen as increasingly 
necessary in the act-of consent. It has been noted that 
increased secrecy can b"e·a corrosive, alienating force in 
our society. 2 If this is the case, then public consent 
is in danger of being undermined. 
Alternatively, however, it could be said that the 
government can cultivate public opinion in its favour, by 
withholding or suppressing sensitive information, or timing 
its release in such a way as to render it harmless. 
The threat of loss of office through offending 
public opinion is, however, only an indirect method of 
I 
influencing government policy formulation and decision-,, 
making. It is by nature a reaction to government a.Eter 
the decisions have been taken. Note also that governments 
generally lose office when they continually offend the 
public. The electoral weapon then, is rather. a blunt 
instrument and is unselective when it votes out a govern-
ment. Good policies along with the bad are rejected. 
Two more positive alternatives to electoral weapons 
1campbell,·op·•citq p •. 74. 
2Hugo Young,· The· cr·o'sstnan· Affa•ir (London : Hamish 
Hamilton Ltd., with Jonathan Cape and the· ·su·n-aay Times,. 
1976}, p. 115. 
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are the participation and involvement of the public in the 
decision-making procedure thus enhancing good goverrunent; 
\ 
and giving prior ·knowledge of intended goverrunent actions 
which helps ensure efficiency. 
Despite the goverrunent commanding the services of 
many of the best minds in the country, numerous advisory 
bodies and a large well-educated bureaucracy, goverrunent 
cictions are not, for various reasons, always exclusively 
_ in the public interest. To ensure that they are, the 
theorists suggest that the public must be involved in 
policy develoµnent and decision-making so as to ensure 
that many different ideas~_: and all sides of the argument 
can be heard. As Mill pointed out: 
Mankind ought to have a rational assurance that 
all objections have been satisfactorily answered; 
and how are they to be answered if that which 
requires to be answered is not spoken .•• 
difficulties should be freely stated. 1 
More recent theorists have restated the .importance of the 
role of public pa,rticipa tion in the conduct of good gov-
ernment and the essential part'._;· information plays in that 
role, 
It is characteristic of democratic government not 
only that the rulers should try and pursue the 
good of the community as a whole, but that they 
should be ready generally to share their reasoning 
with the community as a whole. 2 
We need all the objections to a course of action 
to be canvassed in advance in order to avoid 
embarking on it unadvisedly. 3 
1 John Stuart Mill,· Three Essays·: on· Liberty~ Repre-
sentative Government; The subjection of Worn~n, w7th an 
introduction by Richard Wollheim (Oxford University Press, 
1972), p. 48. 
2J .R. Lucas,· Demb"c:ta.'cy" ahd" Pa:rticipatibn (Penguin 
Fooks Ltd., 1976), p. 83. 
31bid, p. 43. 
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The corollary of these statements is that secret 
decisions and advice .are basically anti-democratic, in 
\ 
that they deny t~e citizen the right to any meaningful 
measure of participation in the affairs of government .. 
By denying the public access to infonnation about_ govern-
ment's intended actions the government itself cannot know 
the true state of public opinion on the issue, because the 
public will not not know that there· is an issue. "To 
know that one has a secret is to know half the secret 
itself. 111 
The ideal, perhaps, is outlined by Walter Lippman, 
If-the country is to be governed with the consent 
of the governed, then the governed must arrive at 
opinions about what their governors want them 
to consent to. 2 · 
In thi_s ideal, opinion and action are as closely allied as 
possible, thus avoiding unnecessary waste through inef:f;ic-
iency. 3 That true democracy is the most efficient fonn 
of government is-a view held by many, and thus it is a 
central concept in the democratic ideal, 
To command the support of the people it is 
essential that ~he processes of decision-making 
should be as open as possible. This is a vital 
characteristic of any democracy ..•. The greater 
the secrecy the greater the sense of exclusion. 
from the decision-making process and the grea,ter 
the difficulty of gaining public acceptance for 
the decisions arrived at - and very probably too, 
the worse· the decisions. :4 
1 Henry Ward Beecher, in The· Tnternation·a·1· Thesaurus 
of Quotations, compiled by Rhoda· Thomas Tripp· (Penguin 
· Books, '1976), ·para. 849. 
2Walter Lippman, quoted in o. John Rogge,· op· c•it., p.643 
3ovenden,·op cit., p. 21. 
4Memorandum of Dissent by Lord Crowther-Hunt and 
Professor Peacock in the Kilbrandon Report, Commission on 
the Constitution, Chapter 11, para. 136; footnoted in Jos-
eph Jacob, 11 Some Reflections on Government Secrecy," l?ublic 
· Law, 1974, p. 27. (Emphasis added). 
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We return to the idea of trust. To command the 
support of the people, the people must trust the_ government. 
\ ' This trust, however, does not come easily, as one of the 
main reasons behind the desire for limitation on_ govern-
ments is the belief that they are inherently untrustworthy. 
Limitation in this case stems from the dissemination of 
1 information allowing uninhibited,wide open debate. 
If in order to guard against tyranny and corrup-
tion, a citizen asks_ "Why are you doing that? 112 and· is 
denied part or all of the answer, then the trust that a 
citizen has for the government begins to break down. The 
denial of the information can itself be seen as a function 
of lack of trust, this time on behalf of the government, 
whose attitude may often·be that the public cannot be 
trusted to react wisely if allowed n.ccess to all the inform-
ation about an issue. 3 That is, the leaders do not 
trust the people to decide for themselves what is best for 
4 them. 
The individual's r_ight to pursue his own interests 
and ambitions is denied by official secrecy, a denial, not 
in order to prevent harm to others (as Mill suggested was 
the only reason for infringing rights) 5 but because in 
the minds of the leaders, the individual's own physical 
1 Justice Black, quoted in O. John Rogge,· op cit., p. 
648. 
2Lucas,· op c•it., p. 84. 
3Freedom of· "Ihforill·ation· an-a· Open· Goverruneht. The 
report of a study group of the Hutt Valley Branch of the 
New Zealand Federation of University Women (Inc.). Ed. 
Myra Harpham, 1978, p. 76. 
4Rogge,· op· ·cit._, p. 15. 
5M i 11 , · op ·c it • , p . 1 5 • 
lS 
and/or moral well being is in danger. This encroachment on 
theindividual's freedom-of access to information is, as 
Mill sees it, 
••• The undertaking to decide that question for 
others without allowing them to hear what can be 
said on the contrary side; 1 
and is therefore patently anti-democratic. 
This argument could be countered by pointing out 
that not only is full public participation physically 
impossible in today• s world, _but that if it were po~sible, 
very few people would bother to participate anyway. Only 
a small number of interested citizens are actively involved 
in political activity and debate, and this could be 
pointed to as evidence that the people are largely satis-
fied with the status quo. In spite of this lack of 
democratic activity by citizens, it is suggested that the 
extent to which the dissenters and activists are tolerated, 
is the truer· measure of democratic commitment. 2 In this 
respect,_ governments point to the level of open and free 
debate as evidence of the upholding of the democratic 
ideal, but neglect the. fact that this debate, through 
secrecy, may be ill-informed and therefore superficial 
and irrelevant .. 
Some bureaucrats would argue that the public inter-
est is best served by a cloak of confidentiality, while 
democrats would a!gue the opposite, saying that the denial 
of information is a virtual suppression of radical or 
1Mill,· bp ~~t., p. 31. 
2ovenden,· op· •cit., p. 22 
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deviant views. In turn this stifling of the radical 
leads to a weakening in the wis]er public debate as the 
stimuli presented by the deviant views has been removed. 1 
As Mill: points out, 
••• The peculiar evil of 'silencing the expression 
of an opinion is that of robbing the human 
race: Posterity as well as the existing gener-
ation: Those who dissent from the opinion still 
more than those who hold it. If the opinion is 
right they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth; if wrong they lose 
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, 
produced by its collision with error. 2 
Even further, he suggests that 
Deviant human thought stifled in the past by 
torture, killings, etc. and now by· legal 
constraints, never blaze into prominence, •• 
this pacification is the sacrifice of the entire 
moral courage of the human mind. 3 · 
With this stifling (by various means, suppression of 
informatipn being one) of opinions unsympathetic to the 
status quo, and thus blunting v_igorous public debate, the 
status quo itself is in danger, 
However true an opinion may be, if it is not 
fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed, it 
will be a dead dogma, not a living truth. 4 
Ultimately the~, the democratic model becomes 
badly eroded by the denial of information, Public 
participation is effectively abrogated; trust breaks down 
between the governed and the governors; public debate 
becomes stunted; public opinion as a central element in the 
the democratic ideal is undermined. This all in_ turn may 
1 ovenden,· op cit. 
2Mill,· bp ~it., p. 20. 
3rbid., pp. 38-42. 
4 . 
Ibid • , p • 4 4 -
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lead.to the disaffection of many sections of society, 
particularly if a ch,;mge of government (the final sane-
- \ 
tion of public opinion) brings little or no meaningfui 
change to the established political scene. 
Through suppression, political activists may become 
increasingly disruptive and subversive, thereby creating 
social instability. The apathetic disinterested majority 
may also become disaffected from_ government policies as 
the gap widens (thro~gh lack of communication) between 
opinion and action. They in turn may become hostile or 
disruptive, thus further increasing instability. 
Candour, then, an attribute so highly valued by 
bureaucrats and government members, _that secrecy must be 
maintained to insure. its continuance within the. circles 
of power, will become incr,easingly muted in.· the area where 
it matters most in a democracy, .. in the dia•l~gue between 
the_ government and the public. 
The picture may be apocalyptic.and it is certainly 
the case that the importance of information in a democracy 
can be ove~-emphasized. However, if one compares the 
ideal to the reality and-follows the possible pattern of 
deterioration of this ideal, then it serves to highlight 
the possible consequences of official secrecy. That is, 
if the secretive practices of a_ government continue to 
infest the democratic model, then that infection will lead 
·to disease and the disease possibly_to death.· 
The suppression of information Cc::ln be ~een. ot 
course as only one of the ailments that ca,n_ a,ff,ect the 
body politic in a democracy •. However, ·the.centn~l theme 
lB 
of democracy, ·freedom in deciding who should. govern and 
justice in the conduct of government, 1 are greatly infring-
ed upon by secrecy. 
Modern theorists go further than simply discussing 
the maintenance of freedom and justice however, by suggest-
ing that a general opening up of the political culture is 
vital to the development of a better democratic society: 
Whereas the central institutions of the expanding 
society were economic, those of the improving 
society are political, that is, public,.9eneral 
and open. 2 
C.B. MacPherson also suggests that: 
The concept of a man's essence is not in the 
maximization of his utilities, but maxirr\ization 
of his human powers~·· man is an infinite 
developer of his human attributes. 3· 
Freedom of information is seen by many as an integral 
element in this pursuit·· of the "irnprov ing society". 
It stands to reason, therefore, that a government's 
denial of public access to information about its activ-
ities,, not only usurps the democratic r.ig'hts of the indiv-
idual, it also impedes the efficiency and justice of 
government which in the long run renders the fuller deyel-
opnent of man•s attributes impossible. 
If it can be concluded then, through considering 
the theory, and measuring this against the practice, th&t 
reform is necessary, how does a democratic society go 
1Lucas,· op cit., p. 110. 
2Ralph Dahrendorf · The New Liberty:· Survival· and , .::.:.::..;:......:..;..=--:.:.~--~~~-;--:-=;----;==.. . 
· Ju·stice in a Changing wo·rld (London : Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1975), p. 81. 
3c.B. MacPherson,· Denl'oc·ratic· Theor :· Es·sa s · in· Re-
tr·i•eval (London : Oxford University Press, 1973., p. 2. 
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about such a task? 
A full answer to this question would be beyond the 
scope of thi~ thesis. 'What this study will attempt to 
show is how our society· m·ight go about it. 
· There are, firstly, several points that 9an be 
raised about such a process of reform. It would seem to 
occur first when a flaw or anomaly arises within the systen}. 
That is, it is no longer operating as it should do, This 
flaw, however, can be seen in an entirely different manner 
depending on the stand point of the observer. The call 
for reform can come from many sectors, while others may 
oppose such a change. Of course, the number and type of 
those who become interested in reform will depend on 
where in the system the changes are mooted and who they 
will affect. 
Theorises will see reality failing to emulate the 
ideal. Pressure groups may see the flaw infringing on 
their area of interest. .'l'he public service may be unsym-
pathetic as reform may make their job more difficult •. 
Government may be forced to take an interest in the prob~ 
lem because of the pressure from groups or from within its 
own ranks. The Opposition may use the promise of reform 
as a device to provide electoral support. The public at 
large may not be aware of a problem if it does not affect 
their daily lives. 
Each group, therefore, depending on the area and 
level of interest, will espouse its own proposals for 
reform. 'i'he proposals, however, _will invariably clash, 
while a solution to the problem needs to be sought in·such 
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a way so as to -satisfy most people without infringing 
on the rights of others. This conflict resolution remains 
\ ' 
in part the task of the government, since it is their 
responsibility to provide good government for all. Reform 
is a method of improving and enhancing this. good government. 
This process, however, of aggregation and articul-
ation of interests, resulting in an appropriate government 
response, is based on one assumption: that our society is 
democratic. We must-ask the question then; does our pol-
itical system follow the principles of democracy? The 
immediate answer by most citizens would be an emphatic 
"yes". Elections are contested freely, basic.freedoms of 
the press, assembly and speech are proclaimed, the citizen 
is assured of equity before the law and so ·on. Of course, 
the real and imperfect world can never live up to the 
ideal we ascribe to. Nevertheless, most people would 
probably consider our system to be a reasonable facsimile 
of the democratic model. Is this in fact so? 
Many critics of the system consider our system far 
from what it should be~ Much of the critique is aimed at 
what is seen as the over-extensive and dominqnt power of 
the executive and the consequent decline in the importance 
of Parliament. Debate within the House has been described 
as at "gutter-level 11 , while the public at large are more 
and more excluded from the 'Complex and sometimes unfath,,..., 
omable activities of government •. 
One explanation for this apparent decline in demo~ 
cratic standards is the pressure of modern society (.infla,.,.., 
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tion, urbanization, overpopulation, etc.) that is threat-
ening the existence of Liberal-democratic states. 1 As an 
\ 
alternative expl'anation, or perhaps as a result of these 
pressures, the decline of democratic ideals can be attri-
buted to a general lack of· coi:nmibneht to these ideals. 
Thus we must ask another question: do our leaders 
and we ourselves sufficiently learn the true nature of 
these beliefs before we put them.into practice?2 If the 
answer to this question is "no", then the prospects of 
real reform occurring, in our case in the area of the 
Official Secrets Act, are bleak. 
This conclusion is drawn if we return to the central 
core of this chapter - are secretive practices of govern-
ment incompatible with the democratic ideal? If the_ gov-
ernors have not truly learnt the meaning of d~Jnocratic 
' beliefs and are therefore unsympathetic or unfamiliar 
with the ideal, then the chances that they will consider 
official secrecy incompatible with democracy are small. 
In turn, ·:the· likelihood of reforming secretive practices 
to make the government ~ore democratic is correspondingly 
small. That is, if our governors do not know what is 
truly democratic, how can they know what is undemocratic? 
If we follow this hypotµetical situation, noting 
that reform will either not occur or if it does, only in 
a superficial, shallow way, then the only way that real 
change can come about is through pressure from public 
. . . 
1 oahrendorf ,· op ·ctt., 
2 . 
Keith OVenden, "Does 
· The· Week, 197 6, l'l.ugust 13. 
p. 10. 
a nemocracy Need Secrecy?" 
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opinion. This will manifest itself either by dismissing 
the government and electing another that will institute 
\ . 
reform or by direct pressure on the government of the day. 
The possibility of the former strategy being 
successful hinges on two factors~ One, that the public 
are sufficiently incensed to dismiss the government and 
two, that there is an alternative. The latter is also 
dependent on two factors, one, that the public are suffic-
iently informed so as to be aware of the problem and be 
able to argue their case coherently and logically. (Of 
course, secrecy itself can hamper and stifle the debate 
over the reform of secrecy.) Secondly, the public, like 
the ·leaders, must be adequately endowed with democratic 
beliefs so that they will be able to draw attention to 
flaws in the practice of the democratic ideal. 
· In this way information and democratic belie;Es 
are vital, not only to a coherent and lively debate, _but 
also to the actual· i•n'itiat"ion of the debate about reform-
ing the debate itself. 
The questions r_aised in this argument and the 
hypothetical situation developed in answering these ques-
tions will be explored further in an examination of the 
attempts to reform the New Zealand Official Secrets Act 
(Chapter Six) and in the conclusions drawn about the Act 
itself (Chapter Seven). .. 
The important fact at this point is that the $~g-
gestion made by proposition one 1 -'That democratic theory 
regards information as .;important in a political system" 
is largely borne out by our discussion of its place in 
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the theory itself. At the same time it has shown that 
secrecy is undemocratic. 
\ , 
The task of Chapter Two is to examine the reasons 
and justifications for the practice of official secrecy. 
In this way both sides of the situation can be studied, 
which will enable some conclusions to be drawn as to the 
acceptability of these justifications with regard to the 
theory. Therefore the democratic commitment, _or other-
wise, can be measured, by highl_ighting the present prac-
tice against the ideals:of the democratic model •. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OFFICIAL SECRECY IN NEW ZEALAND 
I believe ... that in principle secrecy is not 
a habit or a fact which should be cultivated by 
a government agency and that it should exist 
only to the extent it is necessary for the proper 
fulfillment of its functions. 
- Sir Guy Powles. 1 
The second proposition offered in the previous 
chapter was, that official secrecy was contradictory to 
democratic theory. The statement by Sir Guy Powles argues 
that this proposition is simplistic and unrelated to real 
events. Some secrecy is required. It is a necessary 
evil, that can be useful in the execution of the affairs 
of government. The practice, however, should not be 
followed to excess, with the government exercising discre-
tion and caution as to its extent. There would appear to 
be then some, if not as many, justifications for secrecy 
as democratic theory has sanctions against. 
Are these justifications acceptable in practice? 
To what areas of information do they extend? How import-
ant are unofficial reasons for maintaining secrecy? 
All these factors combine to pose the major ques-
tion that this chapter attempts to answer. Why? Why does 
official secrecy exist, what is it and how is it explained? 
The underlying causes of official secrecy in New 
1The Security Intelligence Service Report, by Chief 
Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, 1976. 
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zealand are rooted deeply in the constitutional structure 
of the gove~nment. In fact, the so-called "Westminster" 
(Cabinet) style of government in this country, tradition-
ally sees secrecy as an integral part of the system, 
just as it is an integral part of everyday human existence. 
In more s,imple terms, the style or accepted method 
of government, just as the life style an individual, 
assumes certain practices and procedures, because it is 
. 
expedient for 1:1~~ to do so. In the case of the government 
the modus operandi will persist because it is, as tl:_~y 
see it, the best way to go about their business. 
However, whatever is good for the government, may 
not necessarily be good for the people. Their interests 
do not always coincide. Changes will only occur when the 
status quo ceases,to meet the government's needs or where 
there is pressure for reform from groups outside govern-
ment. The Westminster style of government then is a 
method that has, in the view of successive governments, 
ably suited their own purposes. 
Thus in turn, ·secrecy is a practice that has 
worked, and continues to work to the advantage of the 
government. The release of information is the sole 
preserve of the_ government. Benefits must out-weigh con-
sequences ~f information is to be released, because in 
the absence of public pressure for information there is 
no rule to induce release. Any dispensing of information 
is subject first, to the constitutional constraints, 
and secondly, to the nature and content of that informa-
tion. 
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The two doctrines that are central to the constit-
utional model are collective and ministerial responsibil-
ity, and secrecy is an integral and important element in 
both of them. The other criteria governing confidential-
ity depend on the content of the- information, such as 
personal and private data, scientific and national security 
information, law enforcement information and business and 
financial information, when premature release would 
prejudice the interests of the state. 
However what is meant by this frequently used 
phrase, "interests of the state"? The need for law arises 
in society because conflict occurs.between individual 
interests . 1 Rather than the state being the source of 
law, it is the law. 2 It is then in the interests of 
society and the public at large that the law remains, as 
embodied in the state, the one and only original, legit-
imate authority in that society. 3 
However, can the state have interests as such? If 
an individual breaks the law, this cannot be seen as 
contrary to the "interests of the state", or law, as the 
law has no interests, only purposes. Nevertheless, by 
breaking the law the individual may harm the state and 
thus endanger the public interest. 
It seems, therefore, that the state and the public 
1James M. Buchanan, The Limits of.Liberty: Between 
Anarchy-and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press,1975), p. 12. 
2s. I. Behn and R.S. Peters, The Principles of Polit-
ical Thought: Social Foundations of Democratic States 
(New York: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 19 59) , p. 30 8. 
3 Ibid., p. 306. 
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interest have a common linkage to law. The former being 
the expression of general intent (need for la~J) which is 
above interest groups and beyond political parties, 1 
while it is in the interests of the public to accept the 
authority of the state because it allows them to protect 
the individual's right to do certain things. 2 
Therefore, the "interests of the state" could be 
described as legal fiction. It derives legality by 
virtue of it exercising the sole authority of law, and 
is fictitious because the law cannot have interests in 
the conventional sense. 
Although the two are linked it is perhaps more 
correct to talk of "acting contrary to the public interest" 
rather than the state's. The public interest, however, 
3 may change as different interests struggle for power. 
This struggle may involve a challenge to the validity of 
some laws. This is not in defiance of the state but 
expression of a disagreement with the legal order as 
defined by the interest holding power. Thus the content 
of the legal order may change. 
The state, however, remains as the basis of auth-
. ori ty for the enforcement of these changing laws. It, as 
4 a legal phenomenon, does not change (unless, of course, 
it is forcibly overthrown), only the content of the legal 
1Hans Kelson, General Theory of Law and St~te, 
(translated by Ander Wedburg) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 438. 
2 . 
Buchanan, p. 12. 
3 Kelson, p. 4 38. 
4 rbid., p. 181. 
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order changes. 
The legal order at present sees information such 
\ 
as national security and personal data as areas in need of 
protection by the law. By releasing such information an 
individual, in the view of the temporary legal order, 
damages the state and therefore pre• udices the public 
interest. 
Thus there is general agreement at present as to 
' which areas sould be protected by the state. These 
areas will be discussed in greater detail later in the 
chapter, but at present the first task is to discuss the 
constitutional factors and how they affect, or are seen 
to affect,official secrecy. 
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY .AND SECRECY OF ·cABINET 
The link between the doctrine of collective respons-
ibility and secrecy is a strong one. 
Cabin.et meetings are secret, only in this way 
can completely frank discussion take place 
between Minis.ters within Cabinet and without 
· risk of extraneous pressure. 1 
Further, it is argued that: 
The whole basis of parliamentary government 
would be undermined if Cabinet could not consider 
various proposals that come before it in the 
certain and secure knowledge that those pro-
posals were made in complete candour and were 
for the eyes of that body alone. 2 
The Cabinet maintains this secrecy because in theory all 
major issues should be discussed freely and without fear, 
1sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary, United Kingdom, 
1976. Quoted in Hugo Young, op cit., p. 14. 
2Martin Finlay, quoted in "'fhe Offi'cial Secrets ,Act 
1951 and the Unauthorised Disclosure of Information," bY 
J.J. ·wardell, .Auckland University Law Review, 3, 1 (Sept-
ember 1976), p. 40. 
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and.that members should then accept the decision of the 
majority and keep quiet or resign. 1 All Ministers ~ust 
\. 
stand or fall together in Parliament, if government is 
to be carried out in unity, and thus Cabinet must preserve 
' 2 
a united front. 
Many individuals or groups, such as the Franks 
Committee 3 and the current Minister of Justice, Jim 
McLay4 , have reiterated this point strongly, and the 
depth of feeling for. this principle can be seen in official 
reaction to any threat to the doctrine. 
In May 1974, a University Lecturer, Dr. 0 Suther~ 
land, had his house searched under the Official Secrets 
Act, concerning the leak of a relatively minor Cabinet 
paper. 5 The action was taken under a section to be used 
in "cases of great ~mergency". Although no-one was pro-
secuted in connection with the incident, it does demon-
strate the importance attached to Cabinet confidentiality 
where everything remains secret, except for occasional 
ministerial leaks and brief press statements about policy 
' decisions. This importance was re-emphasised when the 
then Attorney-General, Martin Finlay, said of the Suther-
land affair:- · 
1Marilyn Waring, "Revitalisation of Cc;ibinet, Parl-
iament and PartiesJ" in Hoadley, op cit., p. 44. 
2E.C.S. Wade and G.G. Phillips,- Constitutional Law, 
Sixth Edition (London: Longman & Co., 1960). 
3The "Franks Committee" was set up in the United 
Kingdom in 1972, to investigate the workings of Section 2 
of the Official Secrets Act. 
. 4The Capital Letter, Vol. 2, No. 36 (68), 18 Sept-· 
· ember 1979, p. 1. 
. 5The Press,· 27 May 1974. 
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It is well known and universally accepted that 
papers of this kind bear the stamp of extreme 
confidentiality and go to the very root of Cab-
inet gove~nment. 1 
Similarly, in August 1979, the leak of a Cabinet 
paper {concerned with electricity supply and the environ-
ment) prompted a police investigation. 2 Once again nothing 
came of the inquiry, but the government claimed it had 
acted as a "matter of principle" over a possible breach 
of confidence, and not because the document endangered 
national security or could be prejudicial to the public 
interest. 
In 1976, Keith Ovenden was interviewed at length 
by two senior police officers (one an Assistant Commission~ 
er of Police) in connection with an article that had 
appeared in the paper, The Week, of which he was then the 
contributing editor. The article was about the Powles 
Report in the S.I.S. which, at that time, had not been 
published, and referred to an "Annexe" to the report on 
the case of Dr. Sutch. The police officers said they had 
instructions to try to ascertain whether a leak of secret 
material had occurred. Dr Ovenden told them that he did 
not know who had written the article, and that no-one 
who then worked on the newspaper would be able to tell 
them who had. To the best of his knowledge the matter 
3 was not pursued any further. 
This doctrine of collective responsibility, how-
ever, has in recent years come in for criticism, not only 
1Finlay, in Wardell, op cit., p. 40. 
2The Press, Friday, 3 August 1979. 
3Letter to the author from Dr Ovenden, 18 February 1980. 
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from reform minded citizens, but also from within the 
establishment itself. Essentially the critics claim 
that the secret, collective form of decision-making is 
undemocratic. 
The executive holds the balance of information 
. 1 
and therefore the balance of power. The Cabinet becomes 
a closed shop, out of reach of Parliament (the majority 
party generally controlled by the executive through party 
discipline) and estranged from-the public at large. Not 
only has the scope and sphere of action greatly enlarged 
the power of the executive, but by holding·information 
in confidence, the Cabinet is concentrating power even 
further. 2 
This often startling rise in the power of the 
executive helped to 'prompt an ex-British Cabinet Minister, 
Richard Crossman, to attempt to "light up the secret 
places 113 in British politics by publishing his comprehen-
sive diaries on the activities of the Labour Cabinet of 
1964-70. Although he died before this was possible, a 
condensed version of these diaries appeared in The Sunday 
Times. The government, represented by the Cabinet Secre-
tary, Sir John Hunt, failed to halt these articles, but 
tried again when the executors of Crossman's estate moved 
to release fuller versions of the diaries. Crossman did 
not leave "diaries" as such, but long and often tedious 
tape recordings, from which Janet Morgan prepared a three 
1Jacob, op cit., p. 32. 
2 . . 44 Waring, op c1t., p. . 
3Young, op cit., introduction. 
d . . 1 volume e 1.t1.on. 
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The pieces The Sunday Times published 
were edited excerpts from this version. 
The attempt, by court injunction, to stop these 
volumes being published failed with the judgement being 
hailed as a virtual rejection of Cabinet secrecy, and 
a challenge to the reasoning behind it. 2 
Despite this apparent rebuff to the doctrine of 
collective responsibility and the current practice, in 
Britain at least, of extracting an agreement to differ when 
a Minister deeply disagrees with colleagues, rather than 
resigning, 3 the theory still remains intact and a cogent 
argument for official secrecy.· 
Once again we return to the point that, ·in general, 
if a procedure suits a. government and so long as pressure 
for change is non-existent or feeble and fragmented, it 
will usually persist. Collective responsibility then, 
with. its attendant secrecy, remains an entrenched and 
important facet of Westminster systems, including the 
New Zealand version. It affects, however, only the papers 
that are deliberated on in Cabinet. The greatest depo-
sitory of information is in the government departments who, 
of course, not only administer, but also investigate, 
research and advise on policy matters. We turn, therefore, 
to the second basic concept of Westminster government, 
Ministerial responsibility. 
1 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of ·a Cabinet Minister 
(London : Hamish Hamilton/Cape}, 3 Volumes, 1975-77. 
2Young, op cit., p. 198. 
311 The Government Sieve," The Economist, Vol. 259, 
26 June 1976, p. 7. 
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SECRECY, THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The s~bject of ministerial responsibility is a 
confusing and difficult one, in theory, practice and 
interpretation. It is beyond the scope and capacity of 
this thesis to provide a full explanation and defintion 
of the doctrine •. However, the subject is an important 
one in any discussion on secrecy. In one way or another, 
the concept of individual ministerial responsibility has 
entered into the debate about secrecy and reform. Does 
it belong there? 
One way of looking at the doctrine is in a strictly 
legal sense. That holders of office under the Crown are 
personally .liable for their acts. Moreover, as the Crown 
can do no wrong, every act of the Crown must be done 
through a Minister who can be held responsible. They 
are responsible for acts which they commit or sanction in 
their individual- capacity, 1 perhaps just as any private 
citizen is. 
There is, however, another way of approaching the 
problem. Rather _than ·seeing the Minister legally respons-
ible (which, of course he still remains) the view is 
that by convention, the Minister is, depending on the 
circumstances, collectively or individually responsible 
for his own actions or those of his department, to Parlia-
ment. 
If decisions are made by Cabinet they are automat-
ically endorsed by collective responsibility. However, 
1wade and Phillips, op cit., p. 80. 
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when a Minister makes a decision without consulting 
Cabinet (which is normal practice with regard to matters 
of lesser importance), the Minister must rely on the 
support of Cabinet colleagues if political criticism 
1 becomes vocal. That is, the Cabinet invokes collective 
responsibility to protect one of its members, which 
means making each Minister responsible for the conduct of 
every other Minister and his department. 
Only when Cabinet withdraws its support is the 
Minister in real danger of becoming a victim of a no 
confidence vote. This rarely occurs, however, as such a 
vote could be seen as a warning that the legislative 
branch may not co-operate with the government. As this 
would not only be an embarrassing loss of face, but would 
also show signs of weakness and division, Cabinet will 
support the individual Minister invoking collective respons-
ibility, and thus use their majority to ensure the fail-
~ 
ure of any no confidence vote. 2 
The individual Minister, then, is made responsible 
firstly to Cabinet, and then the Cabinet is rendered 
responsible to Parliament. In one way or another this 
responsibility h.as been used as an argument for keeping 
the public service shrouded in secrecy. It is argued 
that the relationship between the civil servant and the 
Minister must remain private so as to ensure the public 
servant appears apolitical and non-partisan. However, 
1wade and Phillips, op cit., p. 80. 
2K.J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford 
University Press, 1962}, p. 119. 
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the civil servant cannot be blamed by Parliament for 
advice he has given as the Minister must take the respons-
ibility himself. The link then between the doctrine of 
' 
r"7sponsibility thus seems rather tenuous. If a Minister 
takes full responsibility for his actions and the activit-
ies of his department, it stands to reason that the ques-
tion of whether the advice and information given by the 
servant should be open or secret, is irrelevant •. He/she 
cannot be held responsible in the constitutional sense 
by Parliament or the people. Also, although the servant 
may take policy decisions, these are, or should be, 
endorsed by the Minister. 
Therefore advice, views and opinion·s held by publi.c. · 
servants do not need to be protected in order to preserve 
anonymity. It is a meani"ngless concept as the Minister 
· takes the responsibility. Perhaps he may. not be able to 
know all that goes on, but he should be aware of a great 
dea¾ if not all the activities and process, then at least 
the aims and interests. 
Thus, although· there is some argument for keeping 
these relationships between Ministers and civil servants 
confidential, so as to ensure frank interchange of ideas, 
the argument for administrative sec.recy is in many ways 
separate from ministerial responsibility. 
The ideal of .free, frank and private discussion is 
a notion that appeals not only to Cabinet Members, but 
also to the administrative arm of executive government, 
the public service. The traditional argument within the 
public service is that secrecy must remai·n a part of their 
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practice. 
Otherwise it would be impossible for confidential 
inteticoui;-se to be maintained and the administra-
tion of public affairs conducted as the interest13-.. 
of the country requires. 1 
However, the public servants need to shroud this aspect 
of their work in secrecy can be open to debate depending 
on one's view of how a group of people actually operate 
when discussing matters of importance. One is that some 
members (civil servants) would be afraid to air their 
views in public because this may expose them to public 
pressure and ridicule. Another view is that policy and 
discussion would be improved as servants would be' forced 
to think more clearly and argue more coherently their 
respective viewpoints, if they were to be made in public. 
Both arguments have merit, but the fact still remains 
that whatever a public servant may do or advise, the 
ultimate responsibility lies with the Minister and 
Cabinet. Nevertheless, the Minister-civil servant relat-
ionship and the advice given remain generally secret. 
Although leaks do occur and a great deal of material is 
released, all manner of information on public policy and 
administration is denied to the public, ranging from with-
holding figures on allocating beer tax money 2 through to 
the blocking of technical information relevant to the 
nuclear power debate. 3 A Minister has the option to 
release (subject to the dictates of Cabinet) what he likes. 
1williams, op cit., p. 43. 
2The Press, 18 May 1979. 
3Freedom of Information and Open Government,op cit., 
p. 11. 
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One tactic is to release only part of a report, inevit-
1 ably the part that reflects favourably on the government. 
Secrecy also extends to government corporations. 
For instance, many of the activities of Air New Zealand 
recently have had an air of mystery about them. In Aug-
ust 1979 the airline successfully applied to the Air 
Services Licensing Authority to have its profit statement 
withheld from the news media. Despite its claim that it 
was "a private company that has a business to operate 112 
the airline is state owned. Earlier in the year the 
merger of the National Airways Corporation with Air 
New Zealand was also conducted behind a shroud of secrecy. 
Seemingly the public must trust such organisations in 
their operations, as it must trust the public service in 
its actions and_ rely on accountability of the Minister 
through the ballot box and Parliament to achieve some 
measure of control. 
In practice, however, the level of democratic 
control over individual Ministers is often negligible. 
Very few lose office because of their actions as a Mini-
ster. 
To reiterate then, the constitutional arguments 
help place power in the lands of the executive. Secrecy 
gives that body the balance of power by allowing them to 
hold the balance of information necessary to decision-
making. Also, by ensuring the confidentiality of this 
1The editorial in The Star, .Thursday, 5 April 19 79, 
claims Mr Muldoon used this tactic in diverting pressure 
for greater development (through cheap power) in the 
South Island. 
2 The Press, 30 August 1979, p. 1. 
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When discussing the first consideration there is 
perhaps the least anount of argument over secrecy on 
matters concerned with "national security". Generally, 
all freedom of information campaigners include this as 
one area in need of protection., Nevertheless, there is 
some debate as to how widely this definition should be 
drawn. This conflict of interests has been highlighted 
recently in the Sofinsky case. 
The Soviet Ambassador to New Zealand, Mr Sofinsky, 
was expelled from this country on the 25th January 1980, 
after the S.I.S. had detected the transfer of "thousands 
of dollars" from Sofinsky to the Soviet aligned Socialist 
Unity Party (SUP) , 1 an act that was in breach of diplo-
matic conventions. To date, however, this is the only 
information released in connection with the matter. The 
Ministeer in charge of the S.I.S., Mr Muldoon, has 
steadfastly refused to release any further information or 
evidence to back up these allegations based on the 
rationale that "vital interests were at stake 11 • 2 
If .Mr Sofinsky had been a rew Zealander and had 
been accused of a crime (as Dr Sutch was) he would have 
been tried in a court of law. However, the government 
reasoned that expulsion was in order and that information 
must be withheld because the matter was one "of extreme 
sensitivity and delicacy 11 • 3 
The material collected by the S.I.S. was assessed 
1The Christchurch Star, Friday, 25 January 1980, p . 
. 2The Press, Tuesday, 29 January 1980. 
3The Christchurch Star, 25 January 19 80. 
5. 
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by the Intelligence Council and this body, according to 
Mr Talboys, was convinced by the evidence. 1 The Council, 
which independently studies reports by the S.I.S., is 
chaired by the head of the Prime Minister's Department 
(Mr Bernard Galvin) and. includes the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Director of the 
2 
S.I.S. and heads of other departments involved in a case. 
It was their agreement on the validity of the evidence 
that the government-was able to make their decision to 
3 act. 
However, the refusal to release further information 
has allowed the SUP and the ambassador to deny the charges, 
which has permitted a measure of doubt to creep into the 
case. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Rowling, called 
for the facts, claiming that the public had a right to 
know on what grounds the diplomat had been expelled. 4 
However, the head of the S.I.S., Mr Molineaux, the Prime 
Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Talboys, all 
in turn refused to give any information. 
The sums of money involved were unspecified. The 
oddity of involvement of a high ranking diplomat was 
unexplained, and no evidence on the number of transfers, 
or the date of meetings was offered. This state of affairs 
has been criticised by The New Zealand Herald, who 
consider the embargo on information about the case unsat-
isfactory, and has led to public suspicion that the gov-
1The Press, 29 January 1980. 
2The S.I.S. Report, op ci t., p. 101. 
3The Press, 29 January 1980. 
4 rbid. 
er~ent was playing politics. 
In the absence of explanation the public 
is sifpl~ left to nurse doubts. 1 
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The official silence has resulted in some sugges-
tions (by the SUP in particular) that the move was either 
an attempt at discrediting the SUP, or another show of 
a~ger at the Soviet invasion of Afganistan. It seems as 
if the Soviets took the latter view and expelled the New 
Zealand ambassador to Moscow soon after. 2 Once again, the 
official silence enabled the Soviets to take this view as 
there are no 'facts' as such which proved Mr Sofinsky's 
guilt. 
The important point in this affair is that there 
are no formal. means of rendering the· government account-
able. Of course there is a basis for "trust in the 
system113 by virtue of the overseeing role played by the 
Intelligence Council. However, despite the level of 
agreement with expelling_ alleged foreign.subversives, 
the failure to either release information or bring the 
accused to trial in some-way undermines the accountability 
of government in such cases. 
The Sofinsky case also demonstrates the view that 
secrecy must be maintained where disclosure may inhibit 
law enforcement. Any release of evidence or methods 
would·, in the opinion of the government, prejudice and 
inhibit continuing investigations. 4 The same reasoning 
1The New Zealand Herald, 30 January 1980. 
2The Press, 30 January 1980. 
3Ibid. 
4The Christchurch Star, Friday, 25th. _January 1980,p. 5. 
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could be applied to on-going police enquiries. 
However, one area of legal procedure that has 
I 
been a bastion of secrecy in the past, the Jury Room, has 
recently been breached. In a.court decision, Lord 
Chief Justice Widgery (who ruled in favour of the execu-
tors in the Crossman Diaries case in 19751 found that the 
traditional obligation to the secrecy ·of events in the 
jury room could not, by law, be upheld in order to restrain 
publication of jury-room secrets.1 
These areas of secrecy, along with confidentiality 
of business contracts, and financial and budgetary inform-
ation, find general acceptance (though not always) as 
subjects where,· in the public interest,· confidentiality 
overrides disclosure. This is, however; by no means the 
only information that is kept secret. One organisation 
has noted that in practice, as a general rule, the attit-
ude of most government departments is against disclosure. 
This situation of course relates back to ministerial· 
responsibility and a&ninistrative candour. However, 
Ministers and senior department officials do have some 
\ 
discretion in what to disclose. 2 It is here that most 
conflict occurs. 
Individuals and organisations have been unsuccess-
ful in gaining access to information on subjects such as 
.electri.city supply and demand, Beech Forest Research 
Committee minutes, details of the Health Department 
1The Press, 3 December 1979. 
2Freedom of rnformation, Report of the Public Issues 
Committee of the Auckland District Law s~ciety, l978, pp. 
4-5. 
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computer system, and the selection of a film censor. 1 
At the same time, information stored in. the nation-
al archives (ali public records after 25 years} can be 
limited in disclosure by imposing certain conditions or 
barring entry, if the Minister of Internal Affairs 
considers it desirable on the ground of public policy. 2 
A special case regarding the release of information is 
the situation of the scientist. The majority of scientistf: 
in this country are·employed by the government in the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), 
the Forest Service and the like. These are government 
departments operati~g under the same rules as any other 
government ~gency. The advice scientists give to the 
Minister is confidential. If the scientist criticises a 
government decision then he becomes a political oppo~ent. 3 
In a normal department this would be intolerable, and 
this is often so with scientists. However, for scientific 
enquiry. to progress, information needs to be freely 
available. In general then, scientists can freely circul-
ate technical information. Official exceptions to this 
are information abciut beech forest utilisation,· methanes 
4 in the atmosphere and nuclear power. It has already 
been noted that this rule of confidentiality has been· 
applied to the first and third exceptions. 
1Freedom of Information and Open Government, op cit., 
pp. 11-18. 
2Freedom of Information, op cit., pp. 3-4~ 
3o.K.·Clifford, "The Scientist and Freedom of Inform-
ation," Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 
9 (October 1978), p. 457. 
4 rbid., p. 458. 
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However, there are other cases where government 
scientific studies have not had the results released. 
The Consumers Institute has complained of secrecy over 
investigations into cough medicines, ear tags (they had 
t d th . t t' ) d ' 1· l o o eir own es ing an wine qua ity. 
Not only does the practice of administrative 
secrecy inhibit the flow of scientific information, but 
the same can be said of the adherence to a 'scientific' 
code of ethics. It-is seen that the relations~ip be-
tween the scientist and his client (government department, 
private business and so on) is the same as a doctor-patient 
relationship and therefore must remain confidential. 2 
Once again this is contradictory to the scientific method, 
and is a dilemma facing this field of research today. 
The result is, nevertheless, the same - a great deal of 
secrecy over most of the information held in government 
departments. 
Information then on government policy can be with-
held with impunity so long as the Minister or public 
servant sees fit to do so. Many of the examples mentioned 
could not be construed as affecting national security, 
or law enforcement, but nevertheless remain secret. 
Reasons can vary, from protecting administrative candour, 
or because the information was sensitive, or because 
governments are unwilling to trust the judgement of the 
public, fearing they will misinterpret or misunderstand 
1 Consumer, "Why shouldn't Government files be open 
to the public?", No. 160, (1979), p. 86. 
2clifford, op cit., p. 454. 
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the information and its implications. 
The tli.ird·area (after internal workings of·govern-
ment and sensitive information) where it is argued confid-
netiality must be maintained is the privacy of individuals 
and businesses: 
The workings of government should be made· as 
public as possible in order to foster under-
standing between it and the government, but in 
the interests of freedom of the subject, the 
lives of the governed should be made as private 
as possible. 1 
This feeling has given rise to fears about the masses of 
personal and business information (census data, tax 
returns, credit data, criminal records and so on) now 
stored in data banks such as the Wanganui computer. 
Trepidation has been expressed about the possible abuse 
of this information, such as the release of computer 
file-s concerning electric power board subscribers to the 
Inland Revenue Department. 2 
The fear is that not only does the government own 
and control information necessary for complex decision-
making, but also that it has access to centralised per-
sonal information (also useful in decisons, planning and 
so forth) and that this information can be abused, simply 
by releasing embarrassing data about an individual's pri-
vate life or business,.. affairs-. 3 It is perhaps one area 
1wardell, op cit.,·p. 42. 
2The Press, 21 May 1979. 
3The Relationship Betwee·n the Individual and the State 
in Regard to Privacy and Technology (Unpublished research 
paper in Master of Public Policy, 1979), p. 8. 
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where the public anyway are in favour of continued confid-
entiality. 
If the arguments of collective and ministerial 
responsibility, administrative candour, scientific ethics, 
distrust of public comprehension and privacy do not 
entirely explain why there is secrecy ·in government, then 
perhaps the following quotation does: 
The only reason for classifying a document is 
for reasons of security .•• A government official 
who thought that the disclosure of a document 
might cause embarrassment to H.M.G., he might 
well classify it confidential ... Naturally we 
mean politically embarrassing. It is not the 
business of any official to try, or allow the 
government to be embarrassed. This is what 
we are working for. Embarrassment and security 
are not really two different things. 1 
This is perhaps the most ominous justification. Under the 
democratic ideal, surely it is: the obligation of every 
citizen to remain critical of the government, to show up 
its weaknesses, to stimulate debate, _to force· it to rect-
ify its mistakes. Official secrecy, it would seem, is 
designed to prevent debate and criticism from afflicting 
governments. 
Secrecy then is endemic to the whole political 
system, a method by which governments insulate themselves 
and ease public pressure on their busy lives. From the 
top, Cabinet, caucus, public service, through to the 
f 
botton1, party branch. polities and party funding, there is 
I 
secrecy to some extent.or other, each with its own 
1oavid Tribe, The Question of Censorship (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1973}, p. 257. 
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justification and each seemingly necessary to continued 
good government. The hypothesis forwarded by proposition 
\ 
two, that offici.al secrecy was contradictory to democratic 
' theory, can perhaps only be answered subjectively, 
depending on the standpoint one'takes and is qualified by 
considerations of constitution, national security, 
privacy and public interest. Despite much rhetoric on the 
subject from reform groups, M.P.s Prebble and Minogue, and 
a host of other politicians including the Prime Minister, 1 
the practice still persists. Parliament and the public 
are increasingly excluded from decision-making processes. 
Information is scarce and public debate stunted accordingly. 
The executive concentrates more and more power unto 
itself. The old theories of democratic limitation and 
control are obsolete. 
Justifications alone, however, do not explain why 
secrecy should persist. Official secrecy must be enforced. 
Therefore, we turn to the primary weapon in this enforce-
ment, the Official Secrets Act. 
1Press Statement, on the terms of reference for the 
Committee on Official Information, 28 July 1978. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFICIAL SECRETS LEGISLATION: 
THE CASE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR NEW ZEALAND . 
When the New Zealand House of Representatives 
passed the Official Secrets Act in December 1951, their 
action was neither original nor unique. The New Zealand 
legislation owes its origins and present form to four 
British Official Secrets Acts. Thus for a fuller under-
standing of the New Zealand statute, its characteristics, 
implications and powers, we must first. undertake a 
disucssion and analysis of the reasons behind, and the 
passage of, the British Act. 
1889 
The first Official Secrets Act of 1889 was seen as 
necessary after one particularly embarrassing leakage of 
information in 1878, by an underpaid, frustrated and arnbi-
tious Foreign Offic/ 
l 
clerk, Charles Marvin. In exchange 
for money Marvin leaked secret information to a newspaper, 
the London Globe, about the forthcoming Congress of Berlin. 
The information was acutely embarrassing as it detailed 
the compromise worked ou.t between Britain and Russia, 
before the Congress actually began. Although Marvin had 
actually leaked the document there was no evidence that a 
crime had been committed. No documents were stolen (he 
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had-memorised them), there was no question of treason, 
and most importantly there were no legal sanctions on 
\ 
the communication of official secrets. 1 
It took ten years before the first moves were made 
to introduce some statutory protection of official docu-
ments, when a Bill was introduced to the Commons on June 
7th 1888. After a brief explanation, and some equally 
scanty objections to the tenor of the Bill and its intro-
duction, the House was adjourned. On July 12th, however, 
th,_e Bill was withdrawn without explanation. 2 
The following year, however, the government made a 
more serious and successful attempt to give legal protec-
tion to official ·secrets. The Bill was given its first 
reading on February 25th, 1889. 3 On the 28th March, before 
the Bill was to be read a second time, the Attorney-
General, Sir Richard Webster, gave it a brief sixty-
eight word explanation: 
I wish to say just a word or two with regard to 
this Bill. It has been prepared under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of State for War and the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, in order to punish 
the offence of obtaining information and comm-
unicating it against the interests of the State. 
The Bill is an exceedingly simple one and I 
beg to move its second reading. 4 
Members immediately objected to the meagreness of its 
explanation. Despite their wishes to discover more of 
1Jonathan Aitken, Officially Secret (London: Weden-
field and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 7-14. and David Williams, 
Not in the Public Interest: The Problem of Security in 
Democracy (London: Hutchinson, 1965), P~ 17. . 
2House of Commons Debates (Hansard) lS88, June 7. Col. 
1495, and July 12. 
3Hansard 18B9, February 25, Col. 269. 
4 . 
Aitken, op cit., p. 15. 
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what was behind the Bill, it was read a second time with 
little debate. 1 
It _appears that members generally accepted that the 
Bill was directed exclusively at espionage, which in the 
light of the subsequent use of the Act, was a reasonably 
fair assumption. However, the important point to note is 
that it provided a precedent for future Acts, which were 
applied to actions other than espionage. 
On the four occasions that it was debated before 
its final· passage, the Bill received only seven column:s 
f d . . 2 o 1scuss1on. There were a few feeble attempts at 
raising what the future would prove to be pertinent points. 
For instance, Dr Cameron remarked that the Bill restricted 
the flow of information to M.P.s. 3 However, the implica-
tions for the Press were not fully appreciated at the time 
as much of the dis~greement was over the lack of explana-
tion and claims that the legislation was rushed through at 
a time convenient to the government, but not to ·the Oppos-
. . 4 
1 t1on. 
The government did, however, retreat on one point. 
Clause two of the Bill contained a reference to limiting 
the disclosure of official information where it was 
"contrary to the interests of the State or department of 
govermnent or the public interest". The House was 
successful in this case, in securing the omission of 
1 Hansard 1889, February 25, Col. 269. 
2Aitken, op cit., p. 16. 
3aansard 1889, April 116, Col. 659. 
4Hansard 1889, May 23, Col. 906. 
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"department of government" as they had claimed that in. 
its orignial form the Act would have made it illegal to 
obtain information abo~t mismanagement within a depart-
1 ment. Thus the government accepted that there was a 
difference between State secrets, and department secrets, 
a distinction which Aitken suggests has escaped more 
recent enforcers of the Act. 2 
Therefore, with a final parting comment from Mr 
G. Campbell that the Bill was in fact not strong ertough 
against the Press, who publish leaked information (a point 
pursued by later legislators) the Bill was passed in the 
Commons on June 20th. After a brief perusal of the Bill 
by the Lords, the Bill was passed and received the Royal 
Assent on 26th.August 1889. 3 
1911 
The 1889 Act operated unchanged for the next 22 
years with what is described as "exemplary moderation 11 • 4 
It was rarely evoked, and when it was, this was generally 
for crimes concerning military and naval secrets. Despite 
the Act's emphasis on ·espionage, and the moderation in 
application, Williams suggests the Act was chiefly to 
deter citizens from improperly disclosing official secrets, 
and that foreign spies were openly tolerated. Neverthe-
less, many felt the Act was inadequate, and testimony to 
this are two unsuccessful attempts in 1896 and 1908· to 
1Hansard 1889, June 20, Col. 320. 
2Aitken, op cit., p. 16. 
3House of Lords Debates 1889, June 11. 
4 ' .k 't 16 Ait en, op ci ., p. . 
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have the Act strengci1ened. The former endeavoured, 
because of the failure rate of prosecutions, to put the 
I 
onus of proof onto the defendant. Although this Bill was 
withdrawn, this new legal innovation1 was to reappear in 
the 1911 Act. 
The failure of a 1908 Official Secrets Bill, 
several unsatisfactory prosecutions, in the form of 
short sentences, the conviction of some German spies and 
a general recognition that the 1889 Act was inadequate 
helped ensure the speedy success of the 1911 Official 
Secrets Act. Coupled with this, international intrigue 
and the spy scares of the early 1900s had culminated in 
the Agadir gunboat incident off Morocco in 1911 which 
strained Anglo-German relations close to breaki.ng point. In 
this atmosphere of tension an Official Secrets Bill was 
introduced to the Commons (after having been through the 
Lords) on 17th August 1911. 
The circumstances of the introduction of the Bill 
has led to the belief that it was crisis legislation aimed 
at espionage, but according to the Franks Committee the 
Bill had long been discussed (as indicated by the aborted 
Bills of 1896 and 1908) and was definitely intended to 
have a wider scope than espionage. One of the main 
objects was to give greater protection against leakages of 
any type of information, whether or not it was connected 
with defence or security. 2 Thus the catch-all quality of 
section 2 developed by design and not accident. 
l · 11 · ' 23 Wi 1ams, op c1t., p. . 
2emnd 5104, pp. 25-26. 
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After its first reading the government immediately 
1 requested urgency. The following day objections were 
voiced to the increased police powers under the Bill and 
to its hasty passage. The new powers granted were pro-
visions for arrest without warrant, penalties for the 
harbouring of spies·and a clause enabling the search of 
any premises without warrant in an emergency. Mr Morton, 
although not opposed to the Bill, thought it extraordin-
ary that such a Bill-could be passed without an opport-
unity to discuss it. The Attorney-General replied by 
noti~g that it was nothing new with regard to the 1889 
Act, but that "unfore-seen circumstances" saw a need to 
a 1 h 1 . 1 . 2 remo e t e egis ation~ However, what the Attorney-
General had failed to realise was that by rushing through 
this Bill, coupled with the fact that the 18 89 Act had 
not been fully discussed, the serious implications of the 
Official S~crets Acts were never comprehensively debated 
in the House. The important clauses 1 and 2 of the 1911 
Act, which were the most frequently evoked and criticised 
clauses, were not seriously discussed in 1889 or 1911. 
The only points of meaningful discussion were the amended 
clause 2 of 1889 and the objections to part two of section 
1 (1911) that stated 
it shall not be necessary to show that the 
accused person was guilty of any particular act 
••. he may be convicted if from the circumstances 
of the case or his conduct, or known character, 
it appears that his purpose was prejudicial to 
the safety or interests of the State. 
1Hansard 1911, April 17, Col. 2076. 
2Hansard 1911, August 18, Col. 2251. 
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This_had been the objective of the unsuccessful 1896 Bill 
but would, under the 1911 Bill, become law. 
Most of the objections raised were to this clause, 
while the broad, catch-all language of the rest of the 
Bill escaped largely unchallenged. Sir William Byles 
belatedly claimed that it was a "very bad Bill" because of 
its speed of passage and the setting of precedents for 
further Bills. 1 The call was belated as the precedent 
had already been set in 1889. Despite further attempts 
at opposition, the Bill went through all its stages and 
was passed before lunch on the same day, receiving the 
Royal Assent on the 22nd August 1911, thereby repealing 
the 1889 legislation. 
1920 
Initially, the 1911 Act was used exclusively against 
cases of espionage. When the War broke out the government 
enacted very wide emergency regulations which generally 
superceded the Official Secrets Act. The Statute was then 
mainly used for misdemeanours and minor offences. 2 
However, with the war over, the Act again became the main 
weapon against espionage and indiscriminate leakage of 
information when, in 1919 it was applied successfully in 
an area with no relevance to national security. In a case 
against a War Office clerk, the judge ruled that the 
accused had merely committed a departmental offence, but 
the Attorney-General took the case to the Old Bailey whete 
1 Hansard 1911, August 18, Col. 2360. 
2Aitken, op cit., p. 23. 
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Mr Justice Avery ruled that the Act applied to any 
information and not merely to "secrets 111 By doing this 
the judge demonstrated the full potential of the 1911 
Act as a means, applying not only to espionage and the 
communication of secrets, but as a device which at the 
discretion of the government·could be applied to all 
official information. 
With civil unrest in London and terrorist activ-
ities in Ireland, the 1920 Official Secrets: Act was given 
its first reading in the Commons on July 13th. There was 
a substantial gap until the second reading was proposed 
on December 2nd. The-rationale of the Bill became 
I 
clearer as the Attorney-General, Sir Gordon Hewitt, 
explained how the l911 Act was inadequate during the war 
against the increasing ingenuity of spies and that the 
regulations which had effectively dealt with those spies·-
2 during the war had now lapsed. 
The passage of the 1920 Act produced extensive· 
debate, unlike that accorded the first two Official Sec-
rets Acts. The most intense discussion centred around 
the implications. the Act might have for the freedom 
of the Press·. This is in many ways strange, as the 
clauses which contained the greatest danger for the press 
(sections one and twol were part of the 1911 Act. 
Nevertheless, one new clause, section 6, did 
infringe on one of th.e basic tenets of press practice, 
that a journalist does not reveal his sources. The 
1williams, op cit., p. 34. 
2aansard 1920, .December 2, Col. 1585 .• 
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section made it the duty of a person (under threat of 
prosecution) to give any information in relation to an 
offence or suspected offence. That is, a journalist 
could be forced to reveal, for instance, from whom he 
obtained an official document. 
Sir Donald McLean became the bitterest opponent of _ 
the Bill, claiming that it extended much further than 
the original Act intended (a claim not denied by the 
government} and that it attacked the rights of the Press 
and the individual. 1 Despite the government's claim that_ 
"if ever there was an innocent Bill this was one", the 
' ·, \ 
opposition continued to describe it as a war Bill and that 
it gave war power in peace time. The government replied 
that the Bill W.q.S necessary to punish not only spies:, but 
indiscreet publications, while the Lord Chancellor 
strongly urged the curtailing of the liberty of the 
press. 
Also for the ti.rst time in all the debate on off-
icial secrecy, Members began to -object to the ac_tual 
promotion of secrecy,- that i.t was a result of the legis-
lation, and suggested that the whole aim should be to 
establish a minimum of secrecy. The government-on the 
whole.did not deny that the Bill did give wide powers to· 
the executive and some even complained that the Bill was 
not strong enough. Once again, as in 1889 and 1911, the 
Opposition found the brief explanation and vague language 
offensive.· They suggested that personal opinions. were 
in danger and th.at the wide language could lead to a 
1Hansard 1920, December 2, Col. 1585. 
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great deal of abuse. 1 
The fears held in 1889, which had enabled the 
deletion ·of references that would make scrutiny of gov-. 
ernment departments difficult, surfaced again. McLean 
suggested the Bill was. aimed at "crushing opinion" which 
was in opposition to the government and its departments, 
rather than to the state. Another clause that gave the 
government new powers was section 2, which was similar 
to section 1 (2) of the l911 Act, in that it put the onus 
of proof onto the defendant, by making the communication 
with a foreign agent evidence -that his purpose was pre--
judicial to the interests of the state. 
On December 16th the Bi.11 went to committee of the 
whole House where Attorney-General Hewitt gave the 
assurance that "matters of this kind must, I think, be 
. 2 
left to the good judgement of the executive". Immediate-
ly before the th:ird readi:ng, Hewitt admitted once again 
that the Bill was not simply concerned with spies but 
would apply to oth.er areas as well. Thus the 19 20 Act 
which was. only an amendi:ng piece of legislation,_ givi:ng 
greater·power·and creating new.offences, was passed unalt-
ered and received _the Royal Assent on 23rd November 19 20. 
Unlike the previous two Acts the 1920 legislation 
did not automatically apply to the dominions.(_including 
·New Zealand) who, according to Hewitt, were contemplating 
more extensive l~gislation. When ·the Bill came to be 
debated in. th.e New Zealand House, the government assumed 
the same stance as the Imperial government, leaving the• 
l Hansard 1920, December 2, Col. 1589. 
2Hansard 1920, December 16, Col. 983. 
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Bill unaltered and for the most part, unexplained: 
In 1920 the Imperial Government passed another 
Act w~ich,does not apply to the Dominions. The 
reasons were not given for the passing of that 
Act ... Parliament was asked to accept the 
statements of the Prime Minister that the amend-
ments were necessary. The government of New 
Zealand has been informed in confidence of 
certain of these reasons and I regret Sir I 
am unable to give them in the House .•. and I 
can only ask the House to pass the Bill. 1 
The House,· however, took immediate exception to the Bill. 
Mr Sidey seemed baffled as to the reasons why the executive 
should need more power to combat espionage. The Leader of 
the Opposition described the Bill as "one of the most 
extraordinary laws that this House has been asked to pass 
and it contains some of the most dangerous principles 11 • 2 
He called it "prussian type le~islation" which he felt 
was_ going backwards, "whittling away at the liberty of 
people ... (rather than) making .their intellectual advance-
ment possible 11 • 3 
Attorney-General Lee's protestations that the Bill 
was not setting any precedents and that it should, like 
the United Kingdom Act, be taken on trust, came to no 
avail as the Bill never advanced beyond its second read-
ing. Thus off ici.al- secrets in New Zealand, unti 1 19 51 
were only subject to the provisions of the unamended l911 
Act. 
1939 
Some of the most ardent opposition to the official 
1 N.Z.P.D. 1921, December 12, Col. 1033. 
2Ibid., Col. 1034. 
3 Ibid., Col. 1036. 
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secrets legislation was. to th.e possibility that it could 
restrict not only espionage, but also the press and the 
public at lc:irge .· Thus the 1939 Bill, which was intro-
duced on the 9th of February~·- was hailed as a break 
through for the continued freedom of speech, as· it amended 
section 6 of the 1920 Act, which had been adversely 
affecting journalists and professionals. 
Section 6, which defined the powers. of interroga-
tion, was, under the short 1939 Bill, restricted to 
offences under section 1 of the 1911 Act and confined to 
f . 1 cases o espionage. The legislators, however, overlooked 
the fact that section l.was not itself confined to simply 
. 2 espionage. 
Despite the high hopes. for reform generated by th.is 
Act, no further official secrets legislation, or amend-
ments, have yet been enacted in Britain. This is not 
the case, however, in New Zealand where the 1951 Official 
Secrets Act superceded the British legislation. 
Thus a full understanding of the circumstances of 
the United Kingdom Acts rather than a simple analysis of 
their mechanics is desirable if a more complete comprehen-
sion of the New Zealand Act is to be achieved. The fact 
is that prior to 1951 New Zealand had comparatively mild 
official secrets legislation, as it included only the .1911 
legislation. However, all the scant <lebate, incomplete 
observations, vague language, harsh penalties and war-like 
1Hansard 1939, February 9, Col. 1146, and November 
15. 
2 ·11· ' 74 75 Wi iams, op cit., pp. - • 
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clauses that were such a part of the United Kingdom legis-· 
lation, returned as .a legacy embodied in the Act, to 
influence and affect th.e New Zealand statute that was 
heavily based on the British model. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL 
SECRETS ACT 1951 
INTRODUCTION 
l If we accept Ralph Nader 1 s metaphor, that inform-
ation is the currency of democracy, then surely the govern-
ment is the bank where it is all kept. Nevertheless, 
governments, like banks, need to take precautions as to 
the protection of their assets. Seemingly, the main pro-
tection for the government comes in the form of the Offic-
ial Secrets Act. 
If, as the theory suggests, secrecy is undemocratic, 
then any measure that protects and encourages that pract-
ice is itself undemocratic. This is the premise offered 
by proposition three. To answer it requires a detailed 
analysis of the Act 1 s history, structure and implications; 
how it got onto the statute books and why; what it pro~ 
scribes and what its implications are; how important it 
is in the overall system of the protection of official 
secrets. 
The origins of the Act are partially explained in 
the· preceeding chapter. However, before discussing this 
relationship in terms of content between the United King-
. dom legislation and the New Zealand Act, the first task 
1spigelman, op cit., p. 9. 
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is to describe the events suirounding the passage of the 
Act which enables greater insight into the final form of 
the Act, the intention of it and attitudes to it. 
SECRECY AND SECURITY IN NEW ZE!\LAND, 1951 
At the same time as the Bill was before Parliament 
the New Zealand government was in the midst of a general 
reassessment of security measures. The Bristish security 
chief, the Head of MIS, Sir Percy Sillitoe, was in Well-
ington to finalise arrangements for New Zealand security 
organisations. Three objectives were forwarded as to the 
role of the organisations. 
One, the surveillance of subversives; two, 
ensuring security services wer~ adaptable to wartime circum-
stances; and three, the protection of official secrets . 1 ··· 
The increased concern for security measures was adequately 
summed up in The New Zealand Herald for November 7, 1951: 
During recent industrial upheavals the question 
of security in New Zealand came to the fore, and 
with the development of events throughout the 
world and the infiltration of subversive activists, 
the government felt that there was an urgent 
need to review the security set up and ensure 
that proper safeguards were provided. 
Among these "proper safeguards" were the Police Offences 
Amendment Act, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
.Amendment (both designed to aid in e1e contest-with sub-
versives) and the Official secrets Act. 
lThe New Zealand Herald, Tuesda)', 6 November 19 51. 
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Of the three th.e latter received the leas.t atten-
tion from the public, Parliament and the press. The Bill 
was given its first reading on November 2nd. Comment at 
th.is stage was, however, almost non-existent. 
'l'h.e public attention during November and December 
was fixed finnly on the controversial Police Offences 
Bill, which gave the police wide powers and in its 
original form severly limited individual rights, including 
a widely drawn sedition clause. Another particularly 
draconian sanction amounted to a presumption of guilt of 
the defendant, and thus contrary to the traditions of 
British justice, transferred the onus of proof onto the 
defendant. On November 28th, after extreme public press-
ure, this article was amended. 1 
At the same time, however, a clause with similar 
intent and implication was included in the Official Sec-
rets Bill. Despite the sentiments of The Dominion that 
"public makes laws better 11 and that New Zealanders retained 
a "healthy attitude to a long accepted concept of justice 112 
a clause similar to the one the "public had made better" 
persisted, apparently unnoticed and certainly unamended, 
in the Official Secrets Act. 
This situation is indicative of the whole debate 
{or lack ot debate} concerning the passage of the Act. 
The press and the public at large seem to have been satis-
fied with Attorney-General Webb's explanation that the 
Bill was modelled on official ~ecrets legislation in 
1 The Dominion, Wednesday, 14 November, 
29 Novembe.r .19 5l. 
2rbid., Editorial, Friday, · 30 Novemb.er 
·. . . 
and Thursday, · · 
195l. 
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Britain and adapted for New z·ealand conditions, and th.a t 
there were "no claus~s of any consequence that do not 
occur in various·offi:.cial Secrets Acts in the United 
Kingdom 11 • 1 
Th.e Bill preceded to the Statutes Revis.i.on Committee 
with only one minor arne~dment, 2 an alteration brought 
about by pressure from the New Zealand Scientists· Assoc-
iation. The minor ch.a!lge came in response to Association 
fears that any mapping performed on land by a private 
individual would seem to be illegal, unless. the person 
3 charged could prove the contrary. The clause was deleted 
and the Association duly satisfied. However, the scient-
ists had also been concerned with other clauses, notably 
. 4 
sections 3 and 4 •. Their fears, how.ever, were placated 
after leg·a1 advice s~ggested that 
from a practical point of view- there is no 
reason to fear th.e 'onus of· proof• aspect· of 
subsection 2(al. 5 
Furth.er the solicitor giving the advice declared that: 
In my opinion, sections 3 and 4 of this Bill 
c:onstitute no threat to the innocent activity· 
of any person in New· Zealand. 6 
Further assurances of the need for the Act were 
provided by The New z·ealand Herald which suggested there 
was a need to check the "innocent spreading of secret 
- 1N. Z. P .D., Vol. 9 26, November 15 ...;. December 7, 1951, 
p. 1360. When reference to sections are made, for the 
full clause please refer to Appendix One. 
_ 21bid., p. ·1359·. 
311 The Official Secrets Hill," New Zealand Scie•nce 
Review, 9 (November-December 1951), p. 190. 
One. 
4For the full text of the Act please ref er to Appeqdix __ 
5irhe Offici_al Secrets Bill," op c•it. ·, p. _ 191. 
6rbid., p. 192. 
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information" and that "for their own protection the people 
must on occasions be denied knowledge of their own 
affairs". To do this;, it argued the government must equip 
itself with powers much wider than it ever expects: to use. 1 
Opposition to the Act, nevertheless, was not entire-
ly absent. Auckland journalists,for example, were 
alarmed at the Bi.11 and protested to the Prime Minister. 2 
Predictably perhaps some of the most vociferous objec-
tions came from radical left wing groups who, during the 
difficult year of 1951, had incurred the most condemnation 
as possible subversives. The communist weekly,· Peoples 
Voice, called the Official Secrets Bill one of the 
three steps to tyranny, an aide to the replica-· 
tion of a Nazi police state. 3 
The left wing publication, He-re and Now, attacked the Bill 
rather unoriginally by reproducing the arguments used by 
H. Holland during the debate over the 1920 United Kingdom 
4 Act. 
In many ways th.e lack of debate is more significant 
than the actual passage of the Act. This was also noted 
by the Peoples Voice 
Little attention has been paid to the third 
of Holland's trinity of recent fascist-like 
Bills. 5 
Certainly the Labour Party weekly devoted a great deal o,f: 
space to the Police Offences and Industrial Conciliation 
p. 8. 
1 The New Zealand Herald, Editorial, 3 November 1951, 
2Peoples Voice, 21 November 1951, p. 6. 
3 rbid., 5 December 1951. 
4official Secrets Bill 1951: What Holland Said in '· 21-,:. 
Hyet Pseud, Here and Now, 2, No. 3, 1951'. 
5Peoples Voi"ce, 21 November 19 51, p. s .. 
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Amendments, but none at a.11 to the Official Secrets Bill. 1 
Furth.er·words of cauti.on were, however, offered 
by 'rhe New Zealand Hera·ld. It warned that the country 
must guard agai.nst the abuse of the Act 1s. powers, as· it 
could be possible for some over-zealous politician to 
threaten the invocation of the Act to stifle criticism. 
The Herald I s. final, somewhat ironical comment, in view of 
the nature oJ the Act, urged the government to ensure 
that official secrecy did not conflict with legitimate 
freedom of information. 2 
With these brief and sporadic sentiments expressed, 
the Official Secrets Bill preceded swiftly and inexor-
ably through. Parliament_, _where it was passed on December 
5th, a little over a month after its first reading and 
two days before the end of the session. 
Thus 1951, with. the Cold War.raging hot in Korea, 
the year of the waterfront dispute, the national emerg-
ency and perhaps the peak. in the powers of the conservative 
' 3 
National government, saw three of the most controversial 
and restrictive pieces of legislation passed in New Zea-
land1s history. The climate.was. favourable for the reform-
ulation of official secrets legislation, which,. as will 
be· shown presently, resulted in the s tre!}gthening of. the 
government's control over official information. In view 
1New Zealand Labour ·weekly, December-January 1951-52, 
Vol. VII, No. 8. . . 
2The New Zealand Herald, 3 November 1951, p. 8. 
3For one of the first times in New Zealand's history 
an incumbent government actually increased ~ts vote from 
the last election; National regained ~owe: in 1949 with 
51.4% of the vote, whtle a snap election in 1951 increased 
its share to 54.0%. 
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of the circumstances the government took swift action, 
if not full advantag~, wi.th regard to the security threat. 
They now posses·sed multiple legisla_tive weapons,_ giving 
powers to deal w~th any future sedition, subver~ion or 
similar security threat. 
For the moment th.e government lived up to its 
promise that it had no intention of creating a "little 
1 MIS" in New Zealand. The job of security intelligence 
(which involved, of course, official secrets protection} 
was carried out by Police Special Branch. ·However, five 
years later, it set up the Security Intelligence Service, 
2 on the British pattern. 
Nevertheless, in 1951 the_government had at least 
an extensive and powerful Act, with which to protect its 
official secrets. An Act which received very li,ttle 
public attention or journalistic comment, and even less 
parliamentary debate, 3 and therefore seemingly gained wide 
public acceptance or at least acquiescence~ 
What then was· the resemblance between the British 
legislati~n and the l95l_New Zealand Act, and perhaps more 
importantly, did th.e latter piece of legi~lation signif-
icantly alter the situation that existed prior to its 
passage? 
The Relationship With ·the· United "Ki•ngaom Le•gi•slati:on 
Before the Official Secrets Act was: passed in 19 51 
1The New Zealand Herald, Tuesay, 6 November 1951. 
2security Intell"ig•enc·e· se·rvice ;Re·port_,· ·op cit., p~-- 18. 
3Hansard reports- only· three_ pages of debate. The 
House went into committee, which. is unfor_tunately not 
. reported. · 
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the nationls secrets were given protection by the Offi'cial 
Secrets Act (U.K.} 19ll and by section 61 of the Defence 
Act (N.Z.) 1909. The 1920 United Kingdom Act, and thus 
the 1939 Amendment to that Act, did _not apply to New 
Zealand as Parliament had rejected the governmentls 
attempts to pass the Bill in 1921. 
The 1920 Act materially strengthened the government's 
hand in Britain, particularly against the actions 0£ spies. 
Without this Act then,New Zealand had, until 1951, rela-
tively mild legislation dealing with theft or communica-
tion of official information. 
However, in 1951, .the Defence Act had been repealed 
and replaced by the New Zealand Army Act which did not 
contain any provisions covering the custody of official 
secrets. Strangely, one New Zealand newspaper thought 
that the Defence Act·was the only one that applied to 
official secrecy in New Zealand, and thus its repeal 
1 necessitated an Official Secrets Act. Perhaps this 
explains their position, which was one of acceptance and 
support. The relevant section in the Defence Act (.s. 61) 
required heavy prison sentences for disclosure of inform-
ation, including up to life imprisonment for communicating 
to a foreign state. 
At th.e same time th.e l920 .United Kingdom Act was 
designed specifically to aid in the apprehension of spies. 
Therefore, with a general reappraisal of security in New 
Zealand, th.e repealing of a_ powerful anti-commu_ni_ca_tion 
1Th.e New Zealand Herald, Saturday, 3 November 1951, 
p. 10. 
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and spy Act and the absence qf a specific s.py.Act (1920) 
obviously prompted the New Zealand government into devising 
its own Act.1 It did this by simply retaining most of the 
1911 Act and adding the counter-·espionage clauses: of 
the 1920 Act. The result was a powerful and wide ranging 
Act, giving blanket protection to all.government inform-
ation. Only four clauses from 1911 do not appear in the 
1951 Act, three dealing with. technical matters of little 
importance, 1 and the other concerned with incitement to 
offend, a matter covered by· by section 7 of the 1920 Ac½, 
which appears as. section 9 in the New Zealand legislation. 
However, the important addition to the New Zealand 
Act comes from 1920, with four new clauses of consequence, 
all dealing in one way or another with making the job of 
apprehending and convicting ·. spies somewhat easier. The 
new clauses included: making co~unication with foreign 
agents sufficient evidence to convict a defendant on 
charges of spying under section 3; 2 the use of uniforms, 
forged papers, impersonation and so on to gain entry to 
prohibited areas; 3 interference with police who are carry-
ing out duties at a "prohibited place" (generally defence 
4 installations) is made an offence; where it is suspected 
that an offence has been committed, th.e police can be 
given powers to force information, under threat of pro-
1s. 3: definition of a prohibited place; s.5: person 
charged with a felony under the Act may be convicted of a 
misdemeanour; s.11: saving for laws of British possessions. 
2official Secrets Act 1951, Section 4. 
3 rbid., section 5. 
4rbid., section a. 
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secution,from any 9,t.ven individual. 1 These new clauses, 
which invest a great deai of power in law enforcement 
agencies,. were not, however, singled out for discus.s:ton_ 
by-the limited number of those who laid objections to the 
Bill. 
The section that received the most attention, the 
'onus of proof I clause, was· in fact already the law of 
the land, as it was part of the 1911 Act. At the same 
time the Bi.11 was seen as vague and as. a possible w.ea.pon 
enabling suppression of information; 2 but this vagueness 
had also existed before the 1951 Act came into being. 
Nevertheless, the net effect was to give the police 
in New Zealand greater powers to investigate, apprehend 
and·convict individuals who may have been involved in 
the communic~tion of official information, whether by a 
bureaucratic leak, or by· espionage. How was this done? 
The answer to · this lies in the political and legal. 
implications of the Act •. 
THE IMPLICATIONS: THE ACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CHOICE 
One way to describe the Act is to see i.t as a means 
to two ends. The wide powers granted by the Act as dis-
cuss.ed below, being the means and the prevention of spying, 
and restriction ·of official ·information·being the ends. 
These ends, how.ever, relate to one another. 
The restriction of public access to documents may 
lofficial Secrets Act l951, section 11. 
2peoples Voice, 5 December 1951. 
71 
be seen as a means .in its:elf · of hindering the acts of 
spies. Conversely, by preventing s.pi.es from obtaini:ng 
information,' the Act also restricts public access. 
Although these two ends are related, it could not be held 
that the two activities involved (access to information 
and espionage) are equal in their consequences. Although. 
access to, or release of, official information may be 
helpful to spies, it stands to reason that the activities 
of spies would be, or are intended to be, more detrimental 
to society's interests. However, the Act largely disre-
gards any distinction that may lie between the two, as the 
extensive powers aiding arrest and convict.ion along with 
the stiff prison sentences, are applicable to both sets 
of activities. 
How these powers are exercised is up to the govern-
ment. In short, the Act may_ be·used as a discretionary 
political weapon. This point is the most important one 
when one considers the Act. As will be discussed below, 
the wide powers, vague definitions and direction in 
application it may - be used to harrass and muzzle 
those who are outspoken and unsympathetic in their views, 
as the authorities see fit. By looking at the sections 
of the Act, we can see that th.is is so . 
. Al though each section s.eems to have, as indicated 
by the margin headings, specific purposes in mind, on the 
whole the wording is so general as to extend the ambit 
of each section beyond what :tt was originally des~gned for. 
Perhaps this is a function of the repeated failings of the 
British Acts, which induced four different governments to 
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amend and extend the officia·1 secrets legislation in an 
attempt to ensure that no offenders. would escape convict-· 
ion. 
The first clause of substance, section 3, deals. 
ostensibly with spying. It reads: 
3 (l} If any person for any purpose prejudicial 
to the safety or interests of the state 
(a) Approaches. ..• or enters any prohibited place 
or 
(b} Makes any sketch . . . or note which • • . might 
be ..• useful to an enemy, or 
(c} Obtains ..• publishes, or communicates to any 
other person any secret official code word, or 
note ... or information ... which might be useful 
to an enemy - he commits an offence against this 
Act and is liable to up to 14 years inprisonment. 
The wording is all encompassing, and it would seem that 
the line between espionage and simple communication or 
disclosure is somewhat blurred. Certainly it raises many 
questions. What is a •purpose prejudicial to the safety 
or interests of the state'? This is rather a vague con-
cept, as discovered in Chapter Two, and would presumably 
be argued about in any court case, where the prosecution 
(government} would seem to have an advantage in defining 
what could be deemed to be prejudicial. Could the 
interests of a government be construed to coincide with. 
the interests of the state? Is the mere receipt of, or 
publication of, information punishable by 14 years impris-
onment? These questions can only be answered by· seeing 
how the Act has been applied·in practice. Th.is wi.11 be 
attempted in later sections of this dhapter, but it does 
seem cle_ar that section 3 is open to wide interpretation. 
Conviction under section 3 is made considerably 
easier than would normally· be the case in British. law by 
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the provisions of section 4. Unlike section 3, th.is clause 
had not applied in New Zealand prior to 1951, as i.t had 
I 
been part of the rejected 1920 Act. It materially strength.-'-
ens the Act, and thus· the government I s hand, by declaring 
that 
4 {l) In any proceedings against a person for 
an offence against section3, the fact that he 
has been in communication with, or attempted 
to obtain information, or attempted to comm-
unicate with. a foreign agent ... shall be evi 
dence (emphasis added} that he has, for a purpose 
prejudicial to the safety or interests of th.e 
state, obtained or attempted to obtain inform-
ation which. is calculated or intended to be 
directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. 
It would seem that a person can be convicted of spying 
{even without actually communicating informationl if he 
or she has met or visits a fo~eign agent or goes to his 
address or is in possession of an agent's address. 
The first instance of the transferance of the bur-
den of proof from the Crown to the defendant also appears 
in this section. To ensure acquital, the person charged 
must prove to the contrary that he/she did not meet, 
consort or visit with a foreign agent. Personal intention 
is not a factor. In legal terms, mens rea (for a guilty 
act there mus.t be a guilty mind), a basic tenet of law, 
does not generally apply in this case. 
In defence of the section, it can be pointed out 
that certain facts can be admissible as evidence, but 
1 
this is not proof of an offence. What does this mean 
exactly? If taken at face value, it would seem that any 
evidence of a meeting can be brought_, _which und_er normal 
1New Zealand Science· Review, op cit., p. 191.· 
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circumstances would not be admissible, even if i.t is 
irrelevant to the res.t of th.e case. A defendant therefore 
must, to aid his/her case, produce evidence to counter 
allegations: that, in other circumstances, may have never 
been allowed to have been presented as admissible evidence. 
Already, then, even for an offence as: serious as 
spying, the Act is showing itself to be widely drawn, 
powerful and oppressive. 
Section 5 is more exclusively involved with the 
activities of spies, as it deals with some of the tradi-
tional methods of espionage, the unlawful use of uniforms, 
forgery, impersonation and false documents. Although. 
these espionage clauses could apply to the simple act of 
disclosure, any prosecution for.such an act would more 
likely be brought under section 6 •1 For thi_s reason it 
is certainly the most controversial and vilified of all 
the sections, as it relates directly to the dissemination 
and freedom of information to the public. 
6. Wrongful communication of information 
(1) If any person, having in his possession or 
control any secret official code word or password, 
whether of New Zealand or of any other country·, 
or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, docu-
ment, or information which relates to or is used 
in a prohibited place or anything in a prohibited 
place, or which has been made or obtained in 
contravention of this Act, or which has been 
entrusted in confidence to him by any person 
holding office under His Majesty or under the 
Government of any other country, or which he has 
obtained or to which he had access owing to his 
position as a person who holds or has held such 
an office, or as a person who holds or has held a 
contract made on behalf of His Majesty or on 
behalf of the Government of any other country, 
or a contract the performance of which in whole or 
1wardell, op cit., p. 33. 
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in part is carried out in a prohibited place, or 
as a person w.ho is or has been employed under a 
person who holds· or has held such an office or 
contract·-
(a} Communicates the code word, password, sketch, 
plan, model, article, note, document, or information 
to any pers.on other than a person to whom he is 
authorised to communicate it or a person to who, 
it is in the interest of the State his duty to 
communicate it; or 
(bl Uses the information in his possession in 
any manner, or for any purpose, prejudicial to the 
safety or interests of the State; or 
(c} Retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, 
or document in his possession or control when he 
has no right to retain it or when it is contrary 
to his duty to retain it, or fails to comply with 
any directions issued by lawful authority with 
regard to the return or disposal thereof; or 
(d} fails to take reasonable care of, or so 
conducts himself as to endanger the safety of, 
the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, 
secret official code word or password, or inform-
·ation -
he commits an offence against this Act. 
(2} · If any person, having in his possession or 
control any sketch, plan, model, article, note, 
document, or information which related to munit-
ions of war, whether of New Zealand or of any 
other country, communicates it, directly or indir-
ectly, to any person in any manner, or for any 
purpose, prejudicial to the safety or interests 
of the State, he commits an offence against this 
Act. 
(3} If any person receives any secret official 
code word or password, or any sketch, plan, model, 
article, note, document, or information knowing 
or haveing reasonale ground to believe, at the 
time when he receives it, that the code word, 
password, sketch, plan, model, article, note, 
document, or information is communicated to 
him in contravention of this Act, he shall be 
guilty of an offence against this Act, unless he 
proves that the communication to him of the code 
word, password, sketch, plan, model~ article, 
note, document,or information was contrary to his 
desire. 
Section 6 makes it illegal to communicate any inform 
ation without due authorisation. No weighting is made or 
distinction given with regard to classif.ied or unclassified 
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information or between information that would be harmful 
or do no harm to New Zealand. 1 
The section is long and complex and it can never 
be clear what kinds of action involve a risk of prosec-
·t~ 2 u ion. This is unfortunate, as one would consider that 
an Act which applies to all civil servants and all inform-
ation would have the advantage of clarity. The factor 
which upsets this, however, is the need for the consent 
of the Attorney-General to prosecute. No-one in this 
situation can be sure whether or not any proceedings will 
be taken against them. This important point will be dis-
cussed further under section 14. 
One explanation for the breadth of section 6 is 
that it is a 11 lo!}g stop" or a "safety net" which gives 
an extra margin of protection in the event of failure of 
. 3 
other safeguards. 
The i.uplications of section 6 for the freedom of 
information are obvious. If the conduct of full and open 
debate in a democracy depends to a large degree on the 
availability of information, then t...~e provisions of this 
section must seem a formidable obstacle to that debate. 
Of course, masses of information does get released, as 
authorised by the Minister or senior public servants, but 
the section places real restrictions on the free flow of 
iaformation. The full potential of the Act to suppress 
official information, and thus debate, is enormous. It 
1P.S.A. Report, op •cit., p. 1. 
2wardell, op cit., p. 27. 
3united Kingdom Interdepartmental Committee on Section 
2 of the Official Secrets Act (1911), by Lord Franks, 
British Parliamentary Paper, Cmnd 5104, 1972, p. 30. 
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is perhaps worthwhile to reiterate the point that th.e Act 
can be seen as a discretionary political weapon. Blanket 
' \ suppression would, generally, be unacceptable, but 
selective suppression through. the use of this: wide and 
ambiguous section could be employed to silence the awkward 
critics of an administration, but not used to such. an 
extent as to inflame public opinion. Section 6 carried 
to its full potential by an unscrupulous government could 
be a dangerous: and oppressive weapon. 
Nevertheless, and despite the books and articles, 
and the Franks Committee enquiry, all concerned with the 
operation of section 6 in New Zealand and the corresponding 
section 2 iri the United Kingdom, the Act is not signif-
icant ·or controversial for this clause alone. 
Apart from the previous clause, perhaps the most 
controversial section is section 7, which many critics 
argue is a dangerous departure from traditional criminal 
law. The section states that 
7. On prosecution under this Act if, from the 
circumstances of the case or the conduct of the 
accused person, or his known character as proved, 
it appears that his purpose was a purpose pre-
judicial to the safety or interests of the State 
it shall be deemed that his purpose was such a 
purpose unless the contrary is proved ... 
Section 4, which was in a similar vein, applied exclusive-
ly to section._ 3. The ambit of section 7, however, is 
drawn to include any· ot"fence under the Act. This clause, 
along with section 4, severel:( undermines a basic tenet 
of crimi.nal law, by reversing the burden of proof. 
_Instead of the prosecution having to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt it would be true to say.that the Crown 
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only has to offer adequa.te circumsta.ntial ev.i.dence, 1 o:r 
allude to the unsuitable character of a defendant. To 
prove the contrary, the accused must bring evidence to 
refute the prosecution's case. The clause must substant-
ially enhance the chances of a conviction. 
Whilst sections 8 and 9 are comparatively minor 
clauses, dealing with obstruction of police or those on 
guard duty and with th.e harbouring of spies, section 10 
is a different matter. Like section 7, it i.s a departure 
from normal practice. It states: 
10. Every person who attempts to commit an 
offence against this Act, or solicits or incites 
or endeavours .•. or does any act preparatory 
to the commission of an offence against this 
Act he shall be deemed _to have committed that 
offence. 
By making an act preparatory to the commission of an 
offence an offence i.n itself, it becomes a unique clause 
outside of wartime regulations. 2 This fact i.s significant 
as it suggests that the Official Secrets Act could be 
described more accurately as a wartime measure. Section 
10 corresponds with section 7 of the 1920 U.K. Act, which. 
was passed in lieu of lapsed wartime regulations. 3 
Section 10 (N.Z.l is perhaps a good example of a 
clause with wartime intent applying in peacetime. As the 
activities and rights of the individual are generally 
restricted by war measures during any hostilities, section 
1 The Official Secrets Act 1951, Auckland District 
Law Society, Public Issues Committee, 1975, P· 5. 
2wardell, op cit., p. 32~ 
3one of the major criticisms of the 1920 Act when it 
was before Parliament, both in the U.K. and N.Z. was that 
it very much resembled a wartime measure~ 
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10, along with many of th.e other clauses, could be s:een 
as much more restrictive in peacetime than should be the 
case. 
Section 11, the only individual clause in an Offic-
ial Secrets Act that has to s.ome degree been reformed, 
also bears little relationship with criminal law in 
general. In. essence, it denies a person the traditional 
right to silence before he/she has been charged with an 
offence. 1 
11 (l} Where the Commissioner of Police is 
satisfied that thereis reasonable ground for 
suspecting that an offence against this Act has 
been committed and for believing that any person 
is able to furnish information . . . he may apply 
to the "Attorney-General for permission to 
exercise powers ... (to} ... authorise an Inspector 
of Police to require the person believed to be able 
to furnish information to give any information 
in his power relating to the offence •.• and if 
a person ..• fails to comply with such a require-
ment ... he commits an offence against this 
Act. 
The New Zealand section is in fact more restrictive than 
the United Kingdom counterpart, in that it can apply to 
anx: offence, whereas in Britain the power is confined 
specifically to offences involving espionage under section 
1 (U.K. Act). 
Sections 12 and 13, in general, conform to th.e 
:tradi_tional pattern, giving, respectively, power to arrest· 
without warrant ·in an emergency (again perhaps a war power) 
and provision_ for the. i.s·sue of search warrants;. 
For the Act to be accurately described as a discre-
tionary political weapon; it must satisfy· two criteria. 
One, that the .Act has power to coerce. This is· certa,inly 
1wardell, op cit., p. 31. 
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the case with. many sections:. granting government exten.,... 
sive and potent powers. The second criterion is that 
the governme'nt must have some.discretion or choice as 
to the application of the Act. It does have a choice in 
what it may release. It can also exercise discretion in 
the prosecution of would-be offenders. 
14 A prosecution for an offence against this 
Act shall not be instituted except by or with. 
the consent of the Attorney-General 
Section 14, at first glance, looks to be a clause which 
could protect some offenders from possible prosecution 
on matters of trivia. However, it could in effect be a 
device which gives the government a statutory right to 
exercise discretion, where the danger is that a wide and 
ambiguous law can be invoked at the government's plea-
sure, and it may please them to prosecute in order to 
silence an outspoken critic or a troublesome dissenter. 
One view is that this situation is not far removed 
1 from government by arbitrary decree. Rather than being 
a safeguard against oppressive action, it is a safeguard 
dependent. on the will of the executive. 2 The Act gives 
the executive power over prosecution, by placing the 
initiative in the hands of the Attorney-General, who is 
of course a politician and member of Cabinet, although in 
such cases he is acting in his legal and not his political 
role. The Franks Report found no evidence to suggest he 
had ever done otherwise. 3 
1 0£ f icial Secr·ets· Act 19 51, op •ci t., p. 4. 
2wardell, op cit., p. 34. 
3 Cmnd 5104, p. 20. 
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As governments were seen traditionally as: inherently 
untrustwort~y, the democra.tic model was designed to limit 
and control them in their actions •. Section 14, however, 
hands the government power on tr·ust to use at th.ei.r own 
discretion to safeg1:1ard the rights of the people·as they 
see fit. 
Section l4 is th.e last of the important clauses, 
with sections 15 (tria.l and punishment) , 17 (application 
to island territories) and l6 (extent of Act} bearing 
no relevance to the overall question of information in a 
democracy. The only point that could be made concerns 
section 15, that where in the Act punishment is not spec-
ified, an offender can, on conviction, be sentenced to a 
maximum of 7 years on indictment and 1 year if tried 
summarily. 
The point that is important when discussing the 
Official Secrets Act is that of its potential. The 
sµggestion is not that the Act is an oppressive device, 
which the government uses to stifle debate, harrass critics 
and imprison dissenters in order to satisfy its own ends. 
Rather, the Act has potential to muzzle or neutralise 
important people, or people that are s aying important 
and perhaps unsympathetic things, which i,.,y be perceived 
by those responsible for security as undeairable. 
Further to this, however, is th0 (>O\(Cl· that the Act 
has to muzzle those ·fns•ide the bureaucr,'H~)' from letting 
the public know- of actions by the govcrn,.!,(>nt. which are 
. to publ,c interest improper, d:i:shones:t or contrary • 'l'h.e 
case of one group of public servants holr• lo illustrate 
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this point. The great majority of scientists. i.n New Zea-
land are employed by the government and are thus subject 
to the normal restraints and controls that operate on 
any public servant. Although the scientific method de-
mands that information be freely available and that find-: 
ings be open to criticism, 1 those scientists that are 
employed by· the government and particularly those in the 
DSIR are directed that 
extreme care must be taken to ensure that anyone 
issuing statements does not with.out first obtain-
i.ng the Director-Genral 's approval issue any 
statement which contains any criticism, stated 
or implied, of the government of the day. 2 
This direction applies more explicitly to the situation 
where a scientist is not free _to offer public criticism 
on government policy in areas that are close to or in his 
own areas of expertise. Although. this view has: certain 
justifications from the government viewpoint, s.uch. as pro-
tecting top secret defence information, or maintaining 
trust between a Minister and his advisers, 3 the fact still 
remains that scientists are not free to speak out on 
government indiscretions. or mistakes. Secrecy and the 
wide sanctions of the Official Secrets Act can, by muzzling 
in this case scientists but also public servants in 
L 
_ general, prevent exposure and criticism of a government. 
Secrecy Reinforcement: Other Factors 
In seeing the Act in the above terms, we must not 
forget or neglect the importance of other factors which. 
1clifford, op Cit., P· 457. 
2Ibid., p. 456. 
3 . 
Ib ;i. d • , p • 4 5 7 . 
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are involved in the protection o:f official in.formation. 
These factors are significant i.n that they help establish. 
the true relevance of the Act in the overall scheme of 
official secrecy. They fall roughly into two_ groups. 
Firstly, other formal limitations which enforce secrecy. 
These include secrecy provisions in other legislation, 
public service regulations and rules, and of course the 
role of the S.I.S. which has a statutory link with the 
e 
Official SEcrets Act. The second group of limitations are 
those which operate within the institutions of government, 
particularly the public service, which could be described 
as informal. 
Firstly, then, _the formal contraints. Some pieces 
of legislation contain specific reference to secrecy. 
Perhaps the most important of these is section 78 of th.e 
Crimes Act l96l. 
78 Communicating secrets - Everyone owing 
allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen th.erefore 
is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
14 years who within or outside New Zealand -
(a) with intent to prejudice the safety, security 
or defence of New Zealand communicates ... any 
military or scientific information ... the comm-
unication of which is likely to prejudice the 
safety, security or defence of New Zealand; or 
(b} Conspires ..• to do anything mentioned in 
Paragraph (a) of this section. 
In view of the broad provisions of the Official Secrets 
Act, this section seems rather unnecessary. It deals 
exclusively with information regarding 1 national security 1 , 
' a function adequa tley covered by sections· 3, 4 and 6 of 
I 
the Official Secrets Act. 
The duplication of information protection continue_s 
with the Public Service Regulations of 1964, specifically 
numbers 42 and 43. Regulation 42 requires a public 
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servant to· ·complete a ustatutory declaration to the effect 
that his/her attention bas. been drawn to the provisions· 
of ·the Official Secrets Act 1951" •1 In addition: 
(2} Ajl employee shall not use for any purpose, 
other than for the discharge of his official 
duties, information gained or conveyed to h.im 
through his connection with. the publi.c service. 
(3} No information out of the strict course of 
official duty shBll be given, directly or indir-
ectly, or otherwise used by an employee without 
express direction or permission of the Minister. 
(4) Communications. to the press or·other pub-
licity media on matters affecting any department 
of the public service shall be made only by the 
employee authorised to do so. 2 
Once again there is a doubling or 'over-kill' in the 
provision for protection of official information. Regul-
ation 43 d_eclares that no empl.oyee is to take documents 
or copies from official records for any purpose whatever, 
other than in connection with his duties. 3 As a final 
reminder, public servants are told that "information 
obtained officia.lly:-1s confidential and must not be dis-
closed to, or dis.cussed with., any person .•. who is not 
officially concerned i~ the matter 11 • 4 
Further to these regulations there are provisions 
for secrecy in Acts such. as the Wanganui Computer Centre 
Act (designed to protect individuals 1 privacy) and the 
Statistics Act, which has an Oath of secrecy, again the 
intent being to keep personal details confidential. There 
is then, a pletn.ora of secrecy- provisions in statutory· or 
·1Public Service Manual, Section L. 27 .. 
2K.J. Keith, 11 Constraints on Freedom of Dissemination 
of Scientific Knowledge, 11 · NeW' ·ze·a1a·na La·w ·Journ·a1, 7 
December 1976, p. 513. 
. 3 Ihid. 
4The Official Secrets Act, P.S.A. Research. Paper, No. 
9, January 1978, p. 1. 
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departmental regulations which_ gives the government fur-
ther control over official information. However, these 
provisions are only laws, and laws must be enforced. In 
the case of the regulations: above and in some instances 
the Offici.al Secrets Act, this is a task for the depart-
ments themselves, or the police. 
However, a more important body in the protection of 
official information is the Security Intelligence Service. 
In fact, one view is that the service was·set up origin-
ally for _this express purpose. In 19 56 the Americans 
informed the Holland government that they would be denied 
the use of top secret American documents unless New Zealand 
set up an effective service to protect them. Rather than 
lose prestige, and under pressure from the military, 
Mr Holland created the S.I.S •. It replaced th.e Police 
l Special Branch and was modelled on MIS and the F.B.I. 
Although this cannot·be confirmed, the s.r.s. is tied 
directly to the Official Secrets Act by the definition of 
'espionage' (in the S.I.S. Act 1969, and the 1977 Amend-
ment} as "any offence against the Official Secrets Act 
which could benefit the government of any country other 
than New Zealand". If the interpretation of 'espionage 1 
under the Official Secrets Act can be drawn widely, then 
the role of the s.r.s. is widened accordingly. 2 
Not only does the service, as part of its duties, 
investigate (it has no power of arreS t ) any l.mpropriety 
1H.W. Orsman, in Comment, Vol. 7 , No. 4, 28 September 
1966, p. 2. 
2Minogue, in New ·zea"land Law Journal, op ·cit., p. 
220. 
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in the management of official information, but also the 
activity of the service itself is clandesti.ne and secret. 
\ 
To fulfil its responsibilities the service must 
operate largely in a covert manner,therefgre the 
number and identification of staff, details of 
vehicles, methods of work, operation and organ-
isation are not made public. 1 
This attitude is borne out by the recent case involving 
the Russian .Ambassador (see Chapter Two, page 39}. 
We have, then, the Official Secrets Act as a centre 
piece, surrounded and supplemented by numerous statutory 
and regulatory provisions, all of which, in theory, com-
bine to_ give blanket protection to information held by 
the government. To ensure that these laws are upheld there 
is the s.r.s. 2 Taken in total, this is a formidable 
block to the free flow of information. It must be 
stressed again, however, that a great deal of information 
is released by the government, most of it readily. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the initiative 
for disclosu;r-e is with. the Minister, who is self authoris-
ing and senior civil servants, who operate under implied 
authorisation stemming from the authority of the Minister. 3 
These are the formal constraints. The next task is to 
analyse the informal methods of information protection,· 
and in so doing, describe the relative importance of both. 
the informal and formal limitations as they apply to 
government institutions. First .. , th e Public Service. 
1statement by the Service, in Security In'telli:gence 
Service Report, op cit., p. 73. 
2 ·· f the control of the s I For a discussion o · .s., refer 
back to Chapter Two, p. 40. 
3emnd. 5104, p. 14. 
87 
As the Official-Secrets Act is designed in part to 
determine the correct management of official information, 
and as civil servants are the researchers, compi.lers and 
writers of most of this information, th.en it .is reasonable 
to assume that the Act is of paramount importance to the 
conduct of administration. The situation is one where: 
A rule requiring secrecy is established with 
disclosure being ·authorised only in unusual 
cases and the path of least resistance for the 
bureaucrat becomes that of following the general 
rule and avoiding recognition of disconcerting 
exceptions. 1 
Is this in fact the case? Certainly the Franks Committee 
found in Britain that several servants had admitted to 
being prevented from releasing, under pressure from the 
' 2 
Act~ Similar situations arise in New Zealand~ After a· 
major survey was undertaken of New Zealand wine quality by 
the Health Department, the results were withheld because 
until we have a Freedom of Information Act we 
can't do anything - we'd be breaking the Official 
Secrets Act. 3 
However, internal, often imperceptable and informal, 
restraints also operate. Max Weber saw the tendency 
toward secrecy as a function of an administrator's lust 
for power. 4 
Another explanation is that it is the nature of a 
bureaucracy to transfer procedures into purposes and that 
an obsession with secrecy is a single manifestation of 
1Francis E. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas 
of Democracy (Baltimore: The John Hopkin~ Press, 1961}, 
p. 22. 
2 ' . . 
Cmnd. 5104, p. 19. 
3The Christchurch Star, Wednesday, 16 January l980, 
p. 3. 
4Max Weber, quoted in Rourke, op cit., p. 21. 
th. ~ 1 l.S • 
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To achieve these aims a department may not rely 
on measures such as,the Act (although they are obviously 
important} but on semi-formal i.nte~nal restrictions. 
The Franks Committee discovered this to be an important 
factor in the management of information. 2 On the occurr-
ence of a Cabinet paper leak in New Zealand, a State 
Services Commission official said that in most cases of 
disclosure a complain:t was: made to the department, rather· 
than the poli.ce, 3 and thus the matter is dealt with 
internally. 
In 1975 a charge·was not brought under the Official 
Secrets Act because, as: th.e then Prime Minister, Mr Row-
ling points out 
Someone nee:ded · to have acted in a way whi.ch w.as: 
detrimental to the security of the nation 
4 to be charged. This is an int~resting point in itself, 
ih that it demonstrates perhaps to the credit of the. 
government at the time, that prosecution in this case at 
least, under 'the Act, would only be taken if the breach 
was .of sufficient consequence. However, what is o~ 
1 sufficient ~onsequence 1 is again a matter left to the 
discretion of the government. 
The type of internal discipline employed'can come 
in the form of fines and :reprimands (for breaches o;e- rules 
and regulations}· or an equally, if not more severe, 
1Max Weber, quoted in Rourke,· op ·c•it. ,. p. 22. 
2 ' 
Cmnd. 5104, p. 33. 
3The Press, 27 May 1974. 
4 The Christchurch Star, 12 August 1975. 
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method of continuous punishment of an employee while 
they remain in the service. As Franks said, . 
The informal sanction lies in the fact that a 
civil servant who is regarded as unreliable, or 
who tends to overstep the mark and talk too 
freely, will not enjoy such a satisfactory 
career as his colleagues with better judgement 
and greater discretion. He may fail to obtain 
promotion, or he may be given less important and 
attractive jobs. A great majority of civil 
servants wish to perform their duties conscient-
iously, and to enjoy successful careers. 'I'hese 
are powerful, natural incentives to proper 
behaviour. l 
A less sympathetic view of,administrative secrec);' is that 
it stems from sheer bloody mindedness, a desire to protect 
masters and contempt of. the layman's ability to under-
stand. 2 
The civil servant then is surrounded both by rules 
and regulations, departmental pressures, and perhaps his 
own personal feelings of sympathy, loyalty or arrogance. 
On the whole, the combination seems to work. Certainly 
unauthorised publication or release_occurs, but only 
infrequently, and generally with little consequence. 
Civil servants are not the only individuals liable 
under the Act. Cabinet, which generally relies on its 
own internal discipline to maintain confidentiality, does 
not escape the ambit of the Act. In 1915 British Prime 
Minister Asquith confirmed that Cabinet Ministers were 
fully subject to the authority of the Official Secrets 
3 Act. In practice, however, Ministers are self-authorising 
1 Jacob, op cit., p. 47. 
211 official Hide and Seek, 11 Ec·onomis.t, Vol. 265, No. 
5 (1977}, p. 20. 
3williams, op cit., p. 45. 
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and it would seem unlikely that a Minister would be 
prosecuted for disclosure, no matter how/indiscreet. Once 
again, discretion to invoke resides with the government. 
A scandal in Britain in 1938 over a technical 
breach of the Official Secrets Act by a M.P., Duncan 
Sandys, although not resulting in a prosecution, confirmed 
that M.P.s too were subject to the Act, despite the 
protection of parliamentary privilege. 1 
The final, and perhaps most vital, area where the 
'~_6!t can have a debasing effect on the democratic model 
is that of the press. 
THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND THE PRESS 
One of the main fears that was held in connection 
with the Official Secrets Act, both within Britain and 
New Zealand, was the effect it would have on the press. 
If the Act and official secrecy in general deny the press 
information, ·then they must either be satisfied with the 
official version, or obtain information another way. 
Stealing documents is one, 'leaking' information to the 
press is another. Although the former is a drastic means 
under the Act th.e two methods are both criminal.of.fences. 
However some leaks do occur. Many origfnate from 
the Minister himself, while others may occur through idle 
chatter or the leakage by a civil servant of a whole 
document, or part of it or the mere fact of its existence. 
1 The Round Table, Vol. 28 (September 1938}, PP• 803-
805. 
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It stands to reason that leaks by a member of the govern-
ment are designed to aid the government 1 s positi.on, while 
those occurring by accident or without at least tacit 
authorisation may not always be complimentary. 
Some leaks or 1 insider 1 information finds i.ts way 
to weekly newsletters such as TransTasman and The Main 
Report. Both news sheets described as "private", often 
contain advance warning of government action. For instance, 
reports of caucus meetings1 which are secret, prediction 
of legislation, amendments and their content, 2 and descrip-
tions of disagreements between top civil servants and 
members of Cabinet. 3 
Some of the reports could be based on rumour, 
speculation or deduction, while others may originate from 
sources inside the government, such as "our man on the 
hill 11 • 4 The point to note is that the newsletters seem to 
obtain a degree of insider information and ·much of it 
does not reappear in the conventional press. This inform-
ation is, in effect, leakage from government circles yet 
the newsletters are openly tolerated. Once again the 
government is using discretion by allowing them to cont-
inue even though some of the material they publish is i.n 
clear breach of the Act. 
Perhaps one reason is that the letters are available 
only on subscription, and do not circulate to the extent 
1 Trans-Tasman, No. 79/319. 
2The Main Report, Friday, 7 December 1979. 
3 rbid., Friday, 30 November 1979. 
4rbid., Friday, 16 November 1979. 
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that newspapers do. Another may be that the presentation 
is not sensationalist or generally too controversial. 
These newsletters do, however, circulate among the depart-
ments and Ministers in Wellington and are one way of 
finding out what is going on elsewhere in the establish-·.•. 
ment. Thus these leaks are necessary (and therefore 
tolerated) for the functioning·of the system. 
However, leaks that do reach a greater audience 
through the press, and do tend to be controversial, are 
treated in a somewhat different manner. In October 1977 
documents were leaked from the Department of Trade and 
Industry. Although the leakage was more of an embarrass-
ment (or perhaps · beca·u·se i.t was an embarrassment} to 
the government rather than a cause of concern for the 
country as a whole, police investigations were undertaken 
and there were suggestions that the leakage had been a 
breach of the Official Secrets Act. 1 
More recently the New Zealand University Students' 
Association released a confidential Cabinet paper concern-
ing the five yearly_ grant to Universities. The students 
had claimed that the public version that the Minister of 
Education, Mr Wellington, had_ given was contradictory to 
what the Cabinet paper contained. 2 · This release, which 
was acutely embarrassing to Mr Wellington, has led to 
police enquiries and consideration of the possibility of 
charges under the Official Secrets Act. 3 Once again, the 
1The Press, 5 October 1977. 
2The Christchurch Star, 12 February 1980. 
3The Press,14 February 1980. 
93 
release was more remarkable, not for the content of the 
document, but for the reaction of the government. The 
potential of the Act is again demonstrated. It provides 
a means whereby continued 'leaksi are either deterred by 
threat of government action, or are negated by the diver-
sion of police investigations and the suggestion of court 
proceedings. 
The situation of the press in all this is. potentially 
precarious. The Act makes them more liable than most, 
as it is their duty to investigate and collect information. 
Some of it comes in the form of leaks which can, of 
course, be in contravention of the Act. A journalist 
who receives such information.can be charged with an 
offence under section 6, while under section ll a journ-
alist may be required to reveal the source of his inform-
ation. 
One case which demonstrates the difficulties the 
Act poses for journalists occurred in 1971 in th.e United 
Kingdom. The previous year· ·The Bun:day Telegr·a·ph pub-
lished an article which. quoted from a British diplomat's 
report on the Nigerian Civil War. This was alleged to 
show that a Minister had misled Parliament on the extent 
of British involvement. The Tele·graph, its editor, Cairns, 
who communicated the document, and Jonathan Aitken, who 
received it, were charged in 1971 under section 2 of the 
British Official Secrets Act 1911. The prosecution 
contended that the release of confidential diplomatic 
reports would damage the diplomatic system. Also, as 
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Colonel Cairns had signed a form recognising the existence 
and authority of the Act, he was aware that he had no 
right to communicate the report. Aitken and the Tele-
graph., the Crown alleged, both knew that receiving a 
document and publishing it were offences. 
Although the Crown lost the case, largely because 
it had to spell out the official view of the ambit of 
1 section 2, which was unacceptable in a British. court, 
it does point out how a journalist, by following his 
duty to research and publish, can place himself outside 
the law. 
Another case involving section 2 (U.K.) occurred in 
February 1977 when two journalists and a retired corporal 
were arrested and charged under the Act. The circumstances 
of the case are not important (the_corporal communicated 
information about government surveillance methods he had 
learnt seven years previously to two journalists who 
published it) 2 , but the action taken is. The men were 
held without being charged for 45 hours, while Special 
Branch searched and stripped the journalists 1 homes of 
personal and private papers. 3 
Once ~gain the case demonstrates the power the Act 
. grants. Al though one can never be sure if the action was 
des~gned to harass (there was no conviction) the men 
involved. As it was the men suffered irritation and 
inconvenience from the Special Branch action. 
1Minogue, op cit., p. 216. 
2James Michael, "No Right to Know," New Statesman,· 
Vol. 93 (25 February 1977), p. 241. 
3Robin Cook, "ABC of Special Branch,'" New Statesman, 
Vol. 93 (6 May 1977), pp. 589-590. 
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The danger is that government may prevent embarr-
assing information from coming to light. This is perhaps 
a perfectly\reasonable objective for them to have. The 
same could be said about the journalists' task of 
investigating and exposing any weaknesses and indiscretions 
in government action. The Official Secrets Act, however, 
gives the government an unfair advantage in the fulfilment 
of their objective over that of the journalists. 
The discussion above brings us to an important 
state in the analysis: how the Act'has been used in New 
Zealand. 
THE ACT IN ACTION 
One of the major defences for the continued exist-
ence of the Act is the notion that it is "framed so 
comprehensively as to inhibit any regular policy of 
enforcing it11 , 1 and that it is "too absurd to do much 
real damage 11 • 2 It is true that the New Zealand Act, in 
particular, is conspicuous by its scarcity of utilization. 
Once again, though, the worth of the Act in Franks' 
words· is not· to be measured in convictions and prosec-
utions. The important point is its· ·potential for use, 
and how any actual cases under the Act demonstrate this 
potential. 
The first occasion·that the Act was invoked occurred 
in April l969. An outspoken Victoria University lecturer, 
1Keith, op cit., p. 513. 
211Messing About with a Mess," The Economist, Vol. 
245 (7 October 1972}, p. 15. 
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Mr R. Boshier, was interviewed by police, who produced 
an underlined section of the Act, presumably section 11, 
requiring persons to give information in connection with 
an offence. Boshier had, at the recent Labour Party 
conference, brandished a list of names, allegedly members 
of the S.I.S. The police warned that if the list was not 
produced and its source revealed they would search his 
1 room without a warrant. · Al though the police action di.d 
not proceed any further the case is an interesti"ng one. 
Firstly, the section under which the police took their 
action was one that was new to New Zealand law, until 
the 1951 Act was passed, in that it derived from the 1920 
Act. Secondly, and to reiterate, this section had been 
amended in Britain in 1939, where the ambit of it was: 
restricted to espionage only. However this was not done 
in the New Zealand Act, with the section applying to any 
offence against the Act. 
These.developments raise many points. If there 
had been no 1951 Act the interview would never have taken 
place, at least in the circumstances that it did, because 
there would have been no legal basis for the interview. 
Depending on the definition of 1 espionage 1 , if the New 
Zealand section had followed the British example the 
interview again might not have occurred. Also the fact 
that the action was taken under a section from the 1920 
U.K. Act confirms ·the belief that the legislation had 
been strengthened and that the government was prepared to 
1 The Press, Wednesday, 30 April 1969. 
97 
use that strength. Finally, it is interesting that al-
though the list of S.I.S. names was declared to be inacc-
1 ' 
urate, the government still chose to investigate. 
Significantly the person involved was a radical member of 
the Labour Party and obviously a critic·of the Security 
Intelligence Service. 
Conclusions are difficult to draw from this instance, 
but it does demonstrate that there is potential under the 
Act to lttarrass, or at least irritate, outspoken critics. 
The second action taken under the Act was in May 
1974. Once again the individual involved, Dr D. Suther-
land, was an outspoken critic of the government, partic-
ularly the activities of the Justice and Police Dep9,rt-
ments, and was also a·campaigner for the Auckland Commi-
ttee on Racism and Discrimination. The action was taken 
when Attorney-General Martin Finlay learnt that Dr 
Suth.erland had a confidential Cabinet paper. His house 
was searched and he was questioned by the poli,ce. 2· The 
police moved, not because the paper .would be "prejudicial 
· to the interests of the State", but because it was a 
Cabinet paper and its release jeopardised th.e doctrine of 
collective responsibility. 
Once again the Act was used, at the discretion ot 
the Attorney-General, in order to discover the source of 
a document and its whereabouts. In the case of Mr Bashi.er 
,., 
•it was :p1:resumably to· protect the S.I.S. and 'national 
1The Press, Wednesday, 30 April 1969. 
2The Press, 27 May 1974. 
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security' while in the second, to defend the doctrine of 
Cabinet secrecy and collective responsibility. It may 
be coincidental, but on both occasions the individuals 
involved were what could be described as dissenters or 
certainly frequent critics of government activities and 
spokesmen for civil liberties. 
Certainly, when the actions took place, prosecu-
tion did not occur, but in the words. of Mr Littlewood, 
'--
"it appears as if the Act is being used to silence a 
critic 11 • 1 ·These examples are important in showing the 
potential of the Ac.t as a discretionary political weapon, 
to be used in a social way against awkward critics, but 
are minor compared botl\., in seriousness· and consequence 
to the Sutch case of 1974-75 which resulted in a·prosecu-· 
tion. 
The Sutch Case 
On the 27th of September 1974, a Welli~gton econ-
omist and former Secretary of Industries and Commerce, 
Dr William Sutch, was cha?'."ged under the Official Secrets 
Act. The charge was that on or about April 18th and 
September 26th, at Wellington, for a purpose prejudicial 
to the safety or interests of the State, he obtained 
information which was calculated to be or might be or 
was intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an 
enemy. 2 
. 
In other words he was accused of spying. 
The purpose here is· not to rehearse the trial and 
1 The Press, 27 May 1974. 
2The New Zealand Herald, 28th September 1974. 
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assess the merits of the case (Dr Sutch was acquitted), 
but rather to see how the Act operates in a real situation. 
The case also involved the S.I.S., who collected the in-
formation that led to Dr Sutch's arrest and trial. The 
point is to demonstrate how the Act can·be used in a 
social rather than legal way as a method of neutralising 
important people who are seen as being detrimental to 
the national security. 
Dr ·Sutch was obviously seen, because of his actions, 
as such a threat, by the S.I.S. and more recently by Mr 
Muldoon. Why? The essence of the proqecution, S.I.S. 
and Mr .Muldoon 1 s case against Dr Sutch was that he had 
clandestine and suspicious meetings with members·of the 
Soviet Embassy who were recognised as K.G.B. agents. 
Under section 4 of the Act this is deemed to be admissible 
evidence in court on a charge under section 3, under 
which Dr Sutch was charged. 
The s.r.s. claimed to have observed these meetings 
between April 18th and September 26th, which in their view 
and the view of the Attorney-General, were sufficient to 
bring Dr Sutch to trial. 1 This point, along with several 
others, was made clear when a previously confidential 
part of the Powles Report on th.e S. I. S. was released in 
early February 1980. 
The Report showed that the S.I.S. were primarily 
concerned with th.e possible communication of official 
secrets. After the first alleged meeting with the Russians, 
1 The Press, February 1980. 
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enquiries were made about people with whom Dr Sutch was 
in contact and who might have access to classified 
information. The service, however, did not know who wc1::;. 
providing Dr Sutch with government information, if 
indeed anybody was;, but that there was no doubt he had, 
like many thousands of other current or retired senior 
civil servants, some indirect access to official inform-
ation. This, coupled with the meetings, proved, at least 
to the service, and the Solicitor-General, that there was 
1 a case to be answered. Obvious:ly, in the minds; of those 
responsible for security, Dr Sutch was seen as a danger 
to the national security as they perceived it. 
The content of this information, if indeed any 
was obtained, was unknown· to the service. There was also 
no evidence that any information had been communicated. 
Although the charge was laid under section 3, it was 
section 4 which made the communication with a Soviet agent 
admissible evidence, which th.e prosecution relied on to 
t b • • t· 2 ry· to o tain a convic ion. 
If, for instance, section 4 did not exist the s.r.s. 
would have had no evidence on which to base i.ts allega-
tions. Section 3 only deals with. the actual offence of 
obtaining and communicating information. Under this 
section alone there would have been no case to answer. 
The jury, however, did not accept the evidence of 
th.e service as 'proof' and returned a verdict of 'not 
1 The Press, February 1980. 
2The Press, Tuesday, 18 February 1975. 
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guilty'. The damage, however, was done. In the consid-
ered opinion of the service, Dr Sutch was guilty of 
espionage. Sections 3 and 4 allowed them and the govern-
ment to exercise judgement on this threat orotherwis:e 
of an individual to the national security. 
The Prime Minister has recently exercised his 
judgement again on the innocence or guilt of· Dr Sutch and 
released more information about the case to back up his 
. 1 
claims that Dr Sutch was 11 guilty as sin" Th.is 1 new 1 
information, however, added nothing to the evidence that 
had already been presented at the trial. 
He has exercised the same discretion in the 
expulsion of the Soviet Ambassador, Sofinsky •· No conclu-
sive proof was offered in either case, yet the ju~gement 
still stands. No doubt ·i.i: Dr Sutch was alive today (he 
died in 19751, he would still be considered a threat to 
the national interest. ·· No-one can deny the_ government the 
right to hold th.ese opinions, _but the Official Secrets 
Act enables them to give vent to these fears in an effort 
to suppress or neutralise an individual that i.s. r~garded 
as a threat. This is where the danger of the Act lies. 
Its broad, ambiguous wording and all-encompassing powers 
makes arrest and conviction far easier than under any 
other Act, and can ·be used at the disrection of the_ gov-
ernment as a way of securi!19 what they perceive as the 
national interest. 
If the breadth of the Act and the power granted 
1 The Press, 1 February 1980. 
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therein is wide then the definition of the national 
interest can be drawn as wide accordingly. The Act places 
a great deal ·of power in the hands.of the government on 
trust. However the national interest is defined by 
those responsible for security (the government and the 
S.I.S.} the Official Secrets Act is the weapon instru-
mental in the discharge of that responsibility. Everything 
from definition to enforcement is at the discretion of 
the government. 
This may be an extreme view, but the potentia;L 
exists to suppress information, to harrass critics and to 
imprison dissenters. Secrecy and the Official Secrets Act 
can be turned against the democracy theywere designed 
to protect. 
Proposition three stated: "that the o"f.ficial 
Secrets Act, by its existence and its operation, is 
undemocratic".· The discussion above tends to confirm 
this assertion. Many of the clauses are unrelated or 
unique to normal peacetime legal codes. The Act, along 
with other meth.ods,is an impediment to the free flow of 
information, which is necessary to public debate. This 
suggests that reform is needed. Reform of the Act alone, 
however, will not bring about a major transformation in the 
.public debate. 
It is, nevertheless, a_beginning. As this thesis 
is concerned only with the Official Secrets Act, _its con-
sequences and implications to the overall practice of 
official secrecy, the discussion of reform in New Zealand 
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will be restricted to efforts devoted to reform of the 
Act. The first task, however, is to describe briefly 
how other nations have handled the vexing question of 
information in a democracy. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE REFORM OF OFFICIAL SECRECY: 
(1) THE OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE 
The advocates of freedom of information and official 
secrets reform are fond of drawing attention to progress 
made in this area by other western democracies. New 
Zealand, they reason, is far behind with regard to open 
government. 
The focus in this chapter will be on what advances 
have been hade overseas, and in particular what part the 
reform of secrecy legislation or the passage of Freedom 
of Tnformation laws have had on the development of secrecy 
reform in general. The two nations that are mentioned 
most in freedom of information discussions are Sweden 
and the United States, who set up shining examples of 
open government. 
THE UNITED STATES 
Prior to 1966, when the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA} was passed, public access to documents held by the 
national executive was governed by a "need to know" policy 
deriving from the house-keeping statute of 1789, which 
prescribed regulations for the use and preservation of 
documents, and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 
which indicated that official documents should be made 
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available to the public. This access could be restricted 
where relea,se might damage the public interest. 1 Offic-
ial secrecy, however, abounded and was accentuated by 
World War II and the Cold War. The situation changed, 
however, with the passage of the FOIA in 1966. 
The process of reform was long and tortuous. 
Investigation and research, initiated by open government 
advocates from Congress, the press and legal circles, 2 
took some eleven years in the House Special Sub-Committee 
on Government Information. The result was the FOIA. The 
executive branch of government, however, offered no 
assistance or encouragement and for a time the Presidentls 
approval seemed uncertain. 3 
The FOIA, despite the intensive research, proved 
to be inadequate. It was not clear or well written. For 
political or legislative ~easons there were cloudy legal 
phrases, the result being that it often created even more 
4 restrictions on access. In 1971 the Act came under 
Congressional review where in sworn testimony, various 
government and private witnesses gave evidence. 5 Then in. 
1974 the FOIA was amended, although once again it did not 
receive executive endorsement, with President Ford attempt-
ing to veto the amendment. 6 
1Harold C. Relyea "The Freedom of Information Act: 
Its Evolution and Operational Status," Journalism Quart-
erly, Vol. 54, p. 538. 
2 . 
S.J. Archibald, "Working," Columbia Journalism Review, 
p. 54. 
3 Relyea, op cit.~ p. 359. 
-4Archibald, op cit., p. 538. 
5Relyea, op cit., pp. 359-360. 
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These two Acts together involve three basic pro-
visions for public access to information. The first 
requires departments to give notice of what their files 
contain, the second grants an individual right of access 
and a remedy if that right is refused, and the third 
d .b th t d . f . · l escri es e exemp e in ormation. These provisions, 
generally unworkable before the second Act, are now being 
put into practice with encouraging results for American 
freedom of information campaigners. Generally, depart-
ments are efficient in meeting requests for files. There 
are still many _difficulties, particularly with unco-
operative departments, such as the F.B.r. 2 and the admin-
istration of the Act is extremely expensive (around $20 
million.per yearl. 3 However the Act is now a meaningful 
reality and is accepted and operated by most agencies. 4 
The two important points to note, however, in the 
obtaining of the goal of freedom of information are one, 
that the whole exercise took a great deal of time, effort 
and trial and error to find a successful formula. In fact 
20 years elapsed from the instigation of research. to the 
finished product. The second point is that the Acts 
were virtually forced upon the executive branch of govern-
ment. The President and the bureaucracy showed little 
enthusiasm for reform. 
ation Act," Yale Law Journal, 85, 371 (1976}, p. 401. 
. 1Elias Clarke, 11 Holding Government Accountable: The 
Amended Freedom of Information Act," Yale Law Journal, 84, 
741 (1975}, p. 743. 
2 . 
The Press, 31 May 1977. 
3 "Freedom of Information and Open Government, 11 op ci t., 
p. 57. 
4 . 
Relyea, op cit., p. 544. 
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This is an important point for the prospects of 
legislativ~ reform in New Zealand. The division of powers 
in the American system does not in reality exist in the 
New Zealand set up. With the domination of Parliament 
by Cabinet, it seems unlikely that any reforms could be 
forced through without executive approval, in the way 
that the FOIA was in the United States. It stands to 
reason then that any reform undertaken in New Zealand 
must be acceptable to Cabinet. Thus with official 
secrecy being such an integral part of executive and 
administrative government, the possibility of any substan-
tial reform must seem remote. 
SWEDEN 
The freedom of access to official information in 
Sweden has a long history. In gaining power in 1766, one 
pary had promised to fight secrecy in public affairs. It 
kept this pledge by passing the Freedom of the Press Act. 
This gave the press the right to publish documents. 
However this Act did not give an implicit right to demand 
documents. It remains unexplained why the Swedish gov-
ernment took the second step of actually allowing access 
l to official Tecords. 
This Act was incorporated in another such Act in 
1810 and finally reaffirmed in the latest piece of legis-
lation, in 1949. It is now part of the Swedish constitu-
1Nils Herlite, "Publicity of Official Documents in 
Sweden," Public Law, Vol. (1958), p. 5.2. 
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tion. It states: 
To f\urth,er free exchange of opinion and general 
enlightenment every Swedish citizen shall have 
free access to official documents in th.e manner 
specified below. This right shall be subject 
only to such restrictions as are required out of 
consideration for the security of the realm and 
1ts relations with foreigh powers or in connec-
tion with official activities for inspection, 
control or other supervision, or for the preven-
tion and prosecution of crime or to protect the 
legimate economic interests of the state, commun-
ities and individuals or out of consideration for 
the maintenance of privacy, security of the 
person, decency and morality. 1 
Further exceptions are made in the Secrecy Act 1937, 
which can set time limits on certain documents, depending 
on their content, before they are allowed to be released. 
For example, medical records have a 70 year restriction 
operating, while personal income tax returns have a 
limit of 20 years. 2 
This tradition of public access and publicity of 
documents makes every decision accessable. Also the 
authorities are under observation not only after a decision 
is 3 taken, but also at the preparatory stage. It would 
be beyond the scope of this thesis to go into detail with 
regard to the operation of the Swedish system. Suffice 
it to say that the Swedish citizen is afforded far greater 
access to government documents than in any other democracy. 
There are restrictions and there are cases where suppres-
4 sion occurs. However the claim that the government in 
1Herlitz, op cit., p. 51. 
2Neil Elder, Government in Sweden: The Executive at 
Work (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970), p. 152. 
3Herlitz, op cit., p. 55 
4Elder, op cit., p. 152. 
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Swe.den is open and public is to a greater extent justified 
One ·point that is important, however, is the 
constitutional structure of the Swedish government. It 
does have a Cabinet system, but the departments are rela-
tively small and administration as such is carried out 
by Administrative Boards that are generally independent 
of Ministerial control. 1 Thus the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility as operated under a Westminster style of 
government is not a characteristic of the Swedish system.· 
The democratic control then that Parliament in New Zealand 
theoretically exercises over Ministers, does not exist in 
···this form in Sweden. Control is ensured through access 
and publicity. 
Therefore the Swedish system, like the American, 
differs somewhat from a Westminster style of government. 
However, this- does not exclude the possibility of a 
Freedom of Information statute working in this country, 
particularly i.f one considers the apparent lack of 
control afforded New Zealand citizens, through the largely 
outdated and mythical doctrine of rninisteria_l responsibi-
lity. 
Discussion and action concerning the freedom of 
information is not, of course, confined to these two 
countries alone. In Australia,an Interdepartmental 
Committee was set up to consider these issues in l972 by 
the Labor Government, and 1.t reported in l976. The reforms 
advocated followed the lines of the American Acts, although 
1Freedom of Information, op cit., p. 7 
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the final say in what is to be released remained in the 
hands of ~he Minister. Also, no changes were mooted for 
the provision in the Crimes Act 1919, which prohibits 
1 unauthorised disclosure of any documents. 
Following on from this, the Commonwealth Governmen1 
introduced a Freedom of Information Bill into the Senate 
in June l978. The Bill's purpose is "to give members of 
the public rights of access to official documents". 
Said to be the first of its kind to be introduced by a 
government based on the Westminster tradition•it has been 
referred to a select committee which is at present taking 
b . . 2 su missions. 
In Canada, also, some moves have been made to open 
government up. In l973 the government released guidelinef 
for departments, where any government paper or consultant 
report had to be produced to Parliament in response to a 
notice of motion. There were, as would be expected, a 
list of exemptions where the guidelines would not apply. 
As yet, however, these new measures have not been imple-
mented.3 
The Canadians have also enacted a Human Rights 
Bill which gives right of access to personal information 
held by the government, right to request correction of 
that information, and right to control the use of the 
. f . 4 in ormation. 
1Freedom of Information, op cit., p. 10. 
2committee on Official Information, Newsletter, No. 
2, p. 5. 
3Freedom of Information, op cit., .P• 10. 
4Freedorn of Information and Open Government, op cit., 
p. 63. 
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These nations then, along with others such as Fin-
land and Austria,- have moved or are moving toward greater 
openness in government. 
Another country which has recently been debated th 
merits of freedom of information, the United Kingdom, 
is perhaps the most important, as it may provide a lead 
and an example as to how reform may occur in this country 
Of course, what happens in New Zealand is not dictated by 
events'in Britain, but how they handle the issue there is 
significant for New Zealand, as we not only derive our 
Official Secrets Act almost verbatim from the British 
legislation, but also because the British Privy Council i 
still the final court of appeal in the New Zealand legal 
system. 
Attempts at reform in Britain, however, are not 
encouraging for reformers_ The first real moves towards 
government acti~n on freedom of information came in 1969 
when a White Paper,,i "Information and the Public Interest" 
urged the continuance of the practice of releasing certai1 
. f . 1 in ormation. 
A year prior to this the Fulton Committee on the 
Civil Service noted there was "too much secrecy 11 in gov-
errunent and recommended the setting up of a committee to 
analyse this _problem. This advice was followed and the 
Franks Committee was set up in 1972. It was not, as many 
suggest, convened as a result of ·The Sunday ·Tel·e·gra·ph 
case of 1971., which called section 2 of the Official· 
l Freedom of Information and Open Government, op cit., 
p. 65. 
A . a· 1 Secrets et into isrepute. The case did, however, 
provide the terms of reference which were limited to 
investigation into the workings of section 2. 2 
The Committee concluded that: 
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We found section 2 a mess. Its scope is enorm-
ously wide. Any law which irnpringes on th.e 
freedom of information in a democracy should 
be much more tightly drawn. A catch-all provi-
sion is saved from absurdity in operation by the 
sparing exercise of the Attorney-General's 
discretion to prosecute ... People are not sure 
what the section means or how it operates in 
practice or what kinds of action involve real 
risk of prosecution. 3 
The Committee thus recommended that the law should be 
changed so that criminal sanctions are retained only to 
protect what is of real importance. Their suggestion for 
reform was repeal of section 2 (corresponding to section .. 6 
in New Zealand) with the passage of an Official Inform-
ation Act. This would apply to: 
{a) Classifieq infonnation relating to defence, 
security, foreign relations, currency and resources 
{bl Law enforcement information. 
{c} Cabinet documents. 
{d} Private information. 4 
These proposals, although a step in the direction of open 
government, did not receive universal approval. One 
criticism was that by narrowing the scope, it made it less 
absurd for the government to use the Act to restrict 
matters within the reformed section's ambit, which were 
seen as being drawn too w~de. 5 
1Refer to the section on the press, Chapter Four, p 
where.the judge in the case, Mr Justice Caulfield, suggest-
ed section 2 should be "pensioned off". 
2ernnd. 5104, op cit., p. 10. 
3 rbid., p. 35. 
4 rbid., p. 101. 
S"Messing About with a Mess," op cit., p. 16. 
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Whatever the suggestions made by the Franks Commit-
tee, as ye1t no.ne have lead to .any reform of the Official 
Secrets Act. A new Bill was published in 1976 which not 
only embodied the Franks proposals but also removed the 
protection of criminal sanctions from Cabinet documents 
not dealing with national security and information rela-
. . ~ l ting to econom~c security. 
In 1979, after the change of government, a rrotec-
tion of Information Bill, rather than a new Official 
Secrets Bill, was introduced to the House of Commons. It 
was designed, however, as Franks recommended, to replace 
section 2 of the old Act. 2 While the Bill was still beforE 
Parliament the Blunt spy scandal erupted in Britain, 
where the Queen's art adviser and former British. agent 
was exposed as being a Russian agent, both before and 
after the war. ·The wide drafting of the new Bill would, 
if it had been enacted, have prevented these new facts 
from coming to light. At the same time The Times edit-
orial came out against the Bill as being "a grave threat 
to the freedom of the press by restricting its ability no 
investigate and report on subjects of legitimate and often 
significant public concern". 3 
In the face of mounting opposition to the Bill, 
that would "substitute a number of new broad offences for 
the old one", the Bill was dropped. Thus nine years after 
Mr Justice Caulfield suggested section 2 should be 
1Freedom of Information and Open Government, op cit., 
p. 65. 
2The Times, editorial, Wednesday, 1·4 November 19 79, 
p. 13. 
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pensioned off1 and eight years after Lord Franks made his 
recommendations, official secrecy legislation remains 
\ 
unchanged in Britain. 
What then is the relevance-of the overseas exper-
ience for reform in New Zealand? Apart from providing 
examples from which New Zealand reformers can draw to 
compile a blueprint for change, the experience demonstratE 
the process of reform, its pitfalls, obstacles and the 
possible way to success. 
The discussion above raises several points. First 
that reform of legislation and through legislation takes 
a great deal of time. The Swedes have a good measure of 
open government because it has been traditional for 200 
years for them to be so. The United States took 20 years 
to assemble a workable Freedom of Information Act. The 
Australians and British have been investigating the poss-
ibilities of reforms for almost a decade. 
Secondly, that reform must be gradual and based on 
the realities of the present. Sudden reforms may alien-
ate and lose the support of the bureaucracy, yet to be 
successful the reforms must be workable and contribute 
meaningfully to freedom of information. 
Thirdly, for freedom of information to become a 
reality, the reform as far as possible must either not 
be undertaken by the executive (as secrecy is to their 
advantage) or that at least the executive arm of governmen 
1 The summing up by Mr Justice Caulfield in The Sunday 
Telegraph case, quoted in Minogue, op cit., p. 217. 
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must be obliged'to initiate meaningful reform. If 
citizens truly desire freedom of information so as to 
reinforce the public debate then those that are unfairly 
advantaged by official secrecy must be excluded from 
the reform process or at least compelled to reform their 
practices. Obviously the former cannot be the case in 
New Zealand, as it was in the United States. It is 
suggested then that the latter strategy would need to be 
employed. That is, those in power, the executive, must 
be compelled to bring about change. This ·chapter has in 
some measure verified proposition five, at least in the 
overseas experience. It stated: "that because the Act 
is undemocratic·, and there is pressure for change, 
reform will occur"~ 
The task of the next chapter is to describe the 
pressure for change in New. Zealand and to see ho~ this 
may or may not bri~g about reform in this country. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE REFORM OF OFFICIAL SECRECY: 
( 2} NEW ZEALAND 
It is clear that uncontrolled official discretion 
is central to the disease (of secrecy} and that 
curtailment of that discretion must be part of 
any cure. When the law sanctifies unbridled exec-
utive discretion, or when its standards are amb-
iguous and loosely drawn, officials will feel 
justified in interpreting the law in a manner that 
conforms to their own political or bureaucratic 
interests. l 
In returning to the original propostion concerning 
democratic ideals and secrecy, it can be reasoned that if 
freedom of information is an objective of a democratic 
society, then the present state of affairs must be changed. 
Proposition three states "that the Official Secrects 
Act, by its existence and its operation, is undemocratic". 
It can be concluded from the discussion in Chapter Four 
that the New Zealand Act is, by its operation and by the 
nature of its intent, contradictory to the ideals of 
democratic theory. If there is to be change, the corol-
lary of this is proposition four, which claimed "that 
reform is necessary to reconcile practice with democratic 
theory". 
As the statement at the beginning of this chapter 
indicates, political discretion is sanctified by the 
Act and for true reform this discretion must be removed. 
Thus we turn to Proposition five, which states ''that 
because the Act is undemocratic and there is pressure for 
1 1 - a ff ·t 133 Ha perin an Ho man, op ci ., p. . 
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change reform will occur". 
The 1pur~ose of this chapter is to describe the 
pressure for reform, and the attempts past and present 
both to acknowledge that pressure and to change the Act. 
There is, however, one important preliminary point to be 
made in connection with reform in New Zealand. Although 
this thesis concentrates on the Official Secrets Act, its 
operation and reform, the Act as Chapters Two and Four 
show, is only one part of the whole scene. 
Several other pressures and constraints operate in 
government, which are also important in the causation and 
continuation of secrecy. It is clear that mere legisla-
tion is not sufficient. 1 There must be a fundamental 
change in the attitudes and approach by government and 
civil servants to freedom of information, for the goals 
of reform minded critics to become a reality. 
A hypothetical situation was described in Chapter 
One (page 19) which suggested how different groups may 
orient themselves towards the Act and its reform. The 
real circumstances tend to confirm those assertions. 
It was proposed that the public may remain uninter-
ested or unaware of the problem. Certainly the controvers1 
has yet to attract much attention from the public in the 
way that, for instance, abortion, environmental and gener-
al political issues such as the economy and energy have. 
The main thrust for refrom has come from interest 
groups such as the Committee for Freedom of Information, 
1 Freedom of Information, op cit., p. 12. 
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the Council for Civil Liberties, and the Consumer and 
Environmental Councils. 
It was also suggested that governments need to be 
forced into taking an interest in the problem. This 
pressure came firstly in the form of the Sutch trial which 
demonstrated to many the danger of the Act. Agitation 
began within the major parties after this incident, most 
noticeably in the National Party with Hamilton West .M.P., 
Mike Minogue, adopting freedom of information as his 
primary goal. 
It stands to reason that the assertion that public 
servants would remain unsympathetic to reform is valid as 
secrecy and confidential intercourse is ~o much a part of 
administrative practice. Finally, it would be logical to 
assume the opposition would use the promise of reform as 
a device to provide electoral support. In accordance with 
this both major parties have pledges to official secrecy 
reform in their 1978 Election Manifestoes. 
These assumptions indicate that a certain state of 
affairs must exist in the political system for reform to 
occur. As Mike Minogue aptly puts it: 
To obtain the passage of freedom of information 
legislation in New Zealand we require a climate 
of public opinion which the establishment finds 
very difficult to resist. The nature of the 
establishment clearly is such that it cannot 
significantly reform itself. It therefore 
requires to have the necessity for reform thrust 
upon it by the force of a growing clearly expressed 
public concern. 1 
we turn then to the development of reform in New Zealand. 
1Michael Minogue, "Information and Power: Parliament-
ary Reform and the Right to Know," Politics in New Zealand: 
A reader, bys. Levine (ed.) (George Allen and Unwin: 
Sydney, 1978). 
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Previous Attempts and Promises 
It could be argued that the year of 1921 saw, in 
a negative sense, the first reform of official secrecy. 
That is, the provisions (the 1920 U.K. Act) which would 
have strengthened the legislation and meant a retro-
grade step for the freedom of information, were rejected. 
The second instance of 'reform' was in fact in 1951 
when the existing legislation was substantially altered. 
It is fair to describe this as a reform as the government 
of the day saw a flaw in the present system (that is, lax 
security measures} and enacted legislation to remedy that 
situation. However, this change was not a 'reform• in 
terms of improving the democratic model. Although it 
aids the government in the carrying out of their task, it 
remains a hindrance to the fuller tlevelopment of democratic 
ideals and because of the alterations in 1951 is in view 
of its antithesis to the theory even more in need of reform 
The first attempt, however, at reform aimed at 
changing the Act so as to promote open government occurred 
in 1975. In the wake of the controversial Sutch case of 
February 1975, the Labour Government put forward proposals 
to replace the Official Secrets Act. The move was made 
by the Prime Minister, Mr Rowling, in March. The review 
would, he assured, be conducted in public, possibly by a 
Parliamentary Select Cornmittee. 1 The main proponent of 
reform was Attorney-General Martyn Finlay. His view was 
that: 
1christchurch Star, 11 March 1975. 
120 
The Official Secrets Act in its existing state 
imposed a burden on society that was quite out of 
accord woth society's needs. 1 
Further, he suggested "that the Act is too far-reaching 
d • · 11 2 an oppressive . 
Although Mr Rowling seemed anxious to encourage his 
Attorney-General, wishing "to see how quickly the law coulc 
3 be drafted", Dr Finlay was more cautious emphasising that 
any reform while urgent should not be rushed. 4 However, 
the realities of the parliamentary calendar intervened 
and in June Dr Finlay announced that there would be no 
reform of the Act that year as. there "just wasn't any room 
for new material 11 • 5 
Predictably, freedom of information campaigners 
were disappointed, claiming that the government had "turned 
a complete about face on the Act" and urged them to give 
reform the highest priority. 6 
The Labour Government, however, did not get another 
opportunity to carry out the promise of reform as they 
lost power in November 1975. Nevertheless, Labour M.P. 
Richard Prebble, did attempt to bring about some legisla-
tive reform by introducing two private members Freedom 
of Information Bills, one in June 1977, and the other in 
June 1979 .. 
The first Bill saw as its aim the fulfilment of New 
Press, 
Press; 
9 April 1975. 
7· April 1975. 
Press, 10 April l975. 
4christchurch Star, 1 March 
5 The Press, June 1975. 
1975. 
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Zealand's "political right to be informed by the government 
concerning the public business so that the people may 
participate more fully in the democratic process. 111 
Although the National M.P. Mike Minogue can be described 
as the strongest advocate of freedom of information, he 
was not impressed with the Bill, calling it the product 
of an "intellectual virgin" 2 His argument, which is 
pertinent to understanding reform of secrecy, was that 
extreme caution was necessary and a great deal of time and 
3 effort must be spent on any attempt at reform. 
Mr Prebble's two Bills of 1977 and 1979 were dir-
ected at the overall problem of freedom of information and 
not the specific case of the Official Secrets Act. This 
point was noted by Attorney-General Jim McLay, who argued 
that there is a "need for freedom of information review 
to include not only the material in general terms that 
the member (Mr Prebble} i:s asking us to look at, but also 
a review of the Official Secrets Act and also to introduce 
means to ensure the privacy of the individual. 114 
As is the fate of the majority of Private Members 
Bills, both of Mr Prebbles's Freedom of Information Bills 
were rejected. However, during the debate concerning these 
Bills the National Government demonstrated that it too 
was prepared to take steps to reform official secrecy. 
The first stage in the reform process has been the 
setting up of a committee to study the problem. 
l N.Z.P.D. 1977, May 19-June 16, Vol. 410, p. 498. 
2 Ibid . ,- p . 5 0 0 . 
3Ibid., pp. 500-501. 
4 N.Z.P.D. 1979, Vol. p. 738. 
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The Danks Commi tte·e on Official Information 
At\the.time of the Sutch arrest and trial in 1974 
and 1975, not only did the Official Secrets Act come in 
for attention, but so too did the executors of that Act, 
the S.I.S. Accordingly, an enquiry was conducted into 
the service by the Chief Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, 
after certain allegations of misconduct were made against 
the service. 
Apart from making numerous recommendations on the 
operation of the Service itself, Sir Guy criticised secrec: 
1 in government and suggested that consideration be given 
to an examination of the principles and practices of 
classification of information for security purposes within 
. 2 
government departments. 
This fairly specific recommendation with. regard to 
security of information was eventually accepted by the 
National Government in 1978. The enquiry, however, was 
not to be confined to classification alone, with the Comm-
ittee on Official Information being given very wide terms 
of reference. This can be seen when one looks at the 
British experience where three committees at various times 
have undertaken enquiries into particular aspects of sec-
urity of information, the Younger Committee on Privacy, 
the Radcliffe enquiry into the release of Cabinet memoirs 
and most important, the Franks Committee on section 2 of 
the Official Secrets Act (1911). 
1 security Intelligence Service Report, op cit., pp. 
72-73. 
2rbid., p. 35. 
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The terms of reference for the New Zealand Committee 
on Officia~ In~ormation, in one way or another, covers 
all of these aspects: 
1. The basic task of the Committee is to contri-
bute to the larger aim of freedom of information 
by considering the extent to which official inform-
ation can be made readily available to the public. 
With this end in view and having in mind the 
need to safeguard national security, the public 
interest and individual privacy, the Committee 
should in particular: 
(a) review the criteria for applying the classif-
ication now in use and if necessary, recommend the 
redefinition of the categories of information which 
should be protected; and 
(b) examine the purpose and application of the 
Official Secrets Act 1951, in particular section C 
and any other relevant legislation, and recommend 
amending legislation. 
2. In the light of the foregoing review the Comm-
ittee should advance recommendations on changes 
in policies and procedtires which would contribute 
to the aim of freedom of information. 1 
These terms of reference are extremely wide and it is not 
surprising that the Committee twice ·had to delay the com-
pletion date of their report. 
It is perhaps pertinent here it note the difference 
between a Royal Commission and a Committee of Enquiry. 
Although it has been suggested that a Royal Commission is 
for major enquiries, and a Committee is a short-lived 
affair.and has limited terms of reference, there is little 
support for this notion and the idea that the former are 
2 more prestigeous that the latter. 
Certainly. the terms of reference of the Danks 
Committee could hardly be called limited, nor could its 
1 Press Statement, Rt. Hon. R.D. Muldoon, 28 July 1978. 
2Alan C. Simpson, "Commission of Enquiry and the 
Policy Process," 
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work be described as being carried out in haste. The 
Committee m~t f?r the first time on 29 July 1978, and 
has recently indicated that several more months will be 
needed. 1 
Despite the hopes for refom that this Committee 
has engendered, it has not received universal approval. 
Apprehension was voiced at the 'weighting' of the Commi-
ttee. Of the seven members, five are public servants. 
The Auckland District Law Society claimed that these 
servants are "being asked in effect to act as judges in 
their own cause". 2 The two members who are not civil 
servants are the Chairman, Sir Alan Danks, Chairman of the 
University Grants Committee and former Pro-Vice Chancellor 
of the University of Canterbury, and Professor K.J. Keith; 
Dean of Law at Victoria University of Wellington, who is 
on record as an advocate of the reform of the Official 
3 Secrets Act. The civil servants are all long-·serving 
4 administrators and heads of their respective depaxtments. 
The Committee's terms of reference indicate that 
the investigation extends far beyond consideration of the 
Official Secrets Act, therefore it is unnecessary for the 
purposed of this thesis to go into detail'with regard to 
the Committee's work concerning the overall question of 
freedom of information. 
1christchurch Star, 18 February 1980, p. 3. 
2The Press, 22 August 1979, p. 21. 
3Keith, op cit., p. 516. 
4The public servants on the Committee are: Messrs. 
E.A. Kennedy (Chairman, State Services Commission), repl-
aced by his successor, Dr. R.M. Williams~ P.G. Millen, Sec-
retary to the Cabinet; G.S. Orr, Justice Department; F.H. 
Corner, Foreign Affairs; and J.F. Robertson, Defence 
Department. 
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There are two tasks, however, that can be under-
taken. The first is to describe how the Committee is going 
about the enquiry. In this way it can be seen what the 
Committee is looking for and the direction it might be 
taking. Secondly, to look at what activities of the Comm-
ittee relate to the Official Secrets Act. This objective, 
however, is hampered by the fact that Newsletter No. 4 
was unavailable at the time of writing. It is understood 
that this letter was partially to cover the Committee's 
work with regard to the Act. An attempt to gain the news-
letter directly from the Committee when it was released was 
unsuccessful as "they were not designed for general cir-
culation". 1 
First, then, how is the Committee setting about 
its task? Upon the creation of the Committee, written 
submissions were invited from interested parties. These 
constitute the major source of material for the enquiry. 2 
This is important as the Committee can be seen to be 
asking interested parties what they think should be done 
with regard to freedom of information. It may be more 
likely then that the final conclusions will be based on 
a measure of consensus of opinion among the interested 
parties. 
The Commission recieved 129 submissions in all, 
65 from outside the official sector, a further 36 from 
government departments, and 28 from statutory·corporations 
and government agencies. The Committee is also taking 
1 Letter to the author, from the Committee, 29 January, 
1980. 
2Newsletter No. 1, pp. 1-2. 
3Newsletter No. 2, p. 2. 
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advantage of the considerable volume of published material 
concerning developments overseas. 
\ ' 
The third and more general approach is in the form 
of a review of the scope of their enquiry and of the 
broad issues of principle it raises. 1 The Committee 
acknowledges that one of the strongest lines of argument 
is that the Official Secrets Act must be repealed or 
at least substantially revised and limited in ·application. 2 
At the same time, however, they raise the point that where 
portection is justified, what will perform this task if 
3 the Act is repealed? 
Two approaches for change that have been highlighted 
by the submissions and overseas experience are through 
legislation or declaration of guidelines. The legislative 
approach would accord a staturory right of access to offi-
cial information. One of the main arguments for this is 
that nothing less will induce real :change. 4 This approach 
requires some amendment to the Act. The objections raised, 
however, include the notion that '.'mischief without respons-
ibli ty" could be promoted and it would "be costly, -and 
inhibit the free flow of ideals within official circles 11 • 5 
Also, this method, as with any other, has the mandatory 
requirment of listing the statutory exemptions from disclo-
sure, such as defence, for~ign relations, intelligence, 
Cabinet material, law enforcement and economic and private 
1 Newsletter No. 1, p. 2 
2Annex to Newsletter No. 2, p. 6. 
3 Newsletter No. 3, p. 9. 
4Annex to Newsletter No. 2, op cit., p. 2. 
5 rbid. , p. 3. 
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information. Questions are raised, however, as to where 
the protective line should be drawn. 1 
I 
The declaratory approach would again involve some 
amendment to the Official Secrets Act, where guidelines 
or directions from government or a formalised code, per-
haps endorced by Parliament or sanctioned by legislation, 
would provide the basis for the release of certain inform-
ation, and the protection of exempted documents along 
2 similar lines to that in the legislative proposal. 
These investigations then, along with the more 
general study of how best to bring about a workable system 
of freedom of information, are the major occupations of 
the Committee. Their task is indeed imm-ense. What 
conclusions they will come to as regard to the terms of 
reference are as yet unknown, not only to the outside 
observer but perhaps to the Committee members themselves. 
What then does the Committee, its existence, comp-
osition and operation, tell us about prospects for reform 
of the Official Secrets Act? The first point is that 
some efforts are being made towards the cause of reform. 
Change will not occur instantly as some submissions raise 
the point that a transformation in attitude in the State 
Services and society generally is needed, and this can 
1 · d f · 3 on y come over a perio o time. 
Also, some doubts have been raised as to the comp-
osition of the Committee and how this may inhibit a bal-
le-
Annex to Newsletter No. 2, op •ci t., p. 4. 
2 Ibid . , p . 3 . 
3 rbid. 
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anced approach. These doubts can only be answered when 
the report is completed and published. The greatest ques-
tion mark over the Committee's efforts in general rend the 
reform of the Act in particular is how will the Government 
react to any proposals? The statement at the beginning 
of this chapter suggested that the discretion over what 
should and should not be released must be taken out of 
the hands of the executive. 
However, in the New Zealand system the responsibil-
ity for reform in reality rests with the executive. It is 
questionable then whether any reform instituted by the 
Government will move very far in the direction of taking 
these powers out of the hands of the executive. The 
option of implementing any of the Danks Committee proposals 
will remain with the Government. This is perhaps where 
the value of the Committee lies. If, for instance, the 
Committee proposed major changes to the Act, this may stim-
ulate pressures either from within the Government or from 
pressure groups, the press, or the public in general, which 
may force the Government, whatever it may be, to take 
meaningful action in the direction of Official Secrets 
Act reform. 
In the end, pressure for change must come from those 
most vitally interested in policy procedures and outcomes. 
These people could generally be termed· 'educated; citizens, 
members of interested groups, university personnel and 
inquisitive, politically aware individuals, most of whom 
are able to analyse and understand technical and complex 
information about policy alternatives - a prerequisite to 
active participation in goverment. Issues of the day are 
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often argued more.coherently and with greater ferocity by 
interest gro~ps ~nd the government, rather than in Parl-
iament. These include such questions as ecology, native 
forest use and the environment in general, consumer affairs 
and energy, where interest groups, that are vociferous and 
articulate, exert a great deal of pressure on the govern-
ment. 
Information i$ not only seen as 
( 
necessary to the 
question but as a right, an entitlement to know what the 
government is doing. The isses are vital, public pressure 
is helpful in deciding an issue in the public interest, 
and information is the commodity that enables the process 
to continue. This process is in many ways democracy at 
work, yet it can be effectively blocked by government 
refusals to allow the necessary information on policy 
choices and outcomes to be made available. 
Thus this important information and access to it 
becomes a measure of how democratic a society's policy-
making l processes are. If information is blocked to int-
erested parties, then their educated and articulate leaders 
are likely to lead the thrust for reform of the system. 
This is perhaps happening already, although the group of 
people who consistently voice objections to the secrecy 
system and the Act, is small. Sustained and relevant crit-
icisms, and sensible alternatives are as yet generlly absent 
from the political debate. 
When this ceases to be the,case, however, perhaps 
a government may find it impossible to resist the forces 
for reform. 
1 K. Ovenden, The Politics of Steel (London 
1978), p. 195. 
Macmillan, 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
Why is the Official Secrets Act regarded 
as undemocratic, and what attempts are being 
made to change the situation? 
A satisfactory solution to this problem, which 
is the central aim of this thesis, requires a full 
discussion of the importance of information in a dem-
ocracy, the significance of the Official Secrets Act 
in the secrecy system and a description of the process 
of reform. What then were the findings with regard to the 
problem above? 
Information in the public arena will stimulate 
a livelier debate, and encourage discussion and criticism 
of the activities of government. Healthy debate means 
a healthy democracy. Informed and accurate debate then, 
along with public participation in the business of 
government, improves efficiency and helps enforce limit-
ation and control. As the democratic model was conceived 
in order to ensure public control of government, the 
extent to which information is available to the public 
can be seen as a measure of the commitment to the demo-
cratic ideal. 
Politicians that are not commited to democracy 
may be removed by the ultimate sanction of the people, 
the vote. Although information may not be so important in 
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the act of choosing representatives, it can be useful 
in exposing1 uns~itable or unscrupulous politicians. 
Official secrecy however is a system or prac-
tice which abrogates these methods of democratic con-
trol because it inhibits the flow of information to the 
public. The traditional arguments for official secrecy 
lie deeply rooted in the constitutional structure of 
the New Zealand system. To understand these is to also 
understand the existence and intent of the Official 
Secrets Act. 
The twin doctrines of collective and ministerial 
responsibility are major justifications forwarded to 
defend the continuance of official secrecy. Collective 
responsibility requires cabinet secrecy, while individ-
ual responsibility has been linked to the arguments for 
bureaucratic secrecy. This link however is tenuous as a 
civil servant's actions, unbiased or partisan, open or 
secret, are the ultimate responsibility of the Minister 
who, in turn is responsible to cabinet and through 
cabinet to Parliament. 
Separate arguments for the maintainence of 
secrecy in administration include the importance of 
candour.in discussions between servants and with the 
Minister. It is argued that without this freedom of 
discussion, advice and argument would be less than full 
and frank. Secrecy it is suggested, will improve eff-
iciency by ensuring privacy. However it could also be 
argued that if public servants were exposed to public 
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scrutiny, proposals and advice would be more carefully 
thought out and researched. 
Further to the constitutional arguments, official 
secrecy is justified to a certain extent by the content 
of the information. Generally accepted catagories of, 
national security, diplomatic affairs, economic inform-
ation, law enforcement information, details of contracts 
in negotiation and private information are areas that 
most agree, need some measure of protection. 
Protection at present is seen to be provided by 
the Official Secrets Act. The New Zealand Act is derived 
from United Kingdom legislation. The development and 
origins of these Acts are important in understanding 
the present form of the New Zealand legislation. 
The first two British Acts of 1889 and 1911 were 
drafted in vague terms and granted the government wide 
powers. However they received little debate and seem to 
have been generally accepted at the time as being concer-
ned primarily with the problem of espionage. Despite 
this acceptance it is evident that the 1911 Act was also 
designed to restrict to a greater exteht, public access 
to government information. 
The 1920 Act granted further powers, and more 
specifically, was designed to make arrest and conviction 
of spies easier. Unlike the 1911 Act1the 1920 Act did 
not apply to New Zealand as the House of Representatives 
rejected the Bill in 1921. 
Nevertheless in 1951 the New Zealand House passed 
their own Official Secrets Legislation. ~very section of 
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substance was drawn from the British Acts. The result was 
legislation more oppressive than had existed in New Zealand 
I , 
prior to 1951, as it included many of the provisions of the 
rejected 1920 Act and failed to take full account of the 
British Official Secrets Amendment of 1939. 
The Act, passed at the very end of the session of 
1951 was accorded very little debate, both in Parliament 
and amongst the public at large. 
Several provisions were contradictory to traditional 
law. One placed the burden of proof on the defendant, an-
other made actions preparatory to an offence an offence in 
itself, while another allowed certain evidence to be bro-
ught in a case that in normal circumstances would be in-
admissable. 
One of the main defences of the Act is that it is 
so wide and ridiculous to ever be used in an oppressive 
manner. However this is based on the assumption that 
governments are to be trusted with discretion in the appl-
ication of the Act. Thus the Act by it's existance has 
potential to be used as.a discretionary political weapon 
in the interests of a government, to silence and harass 
dissenters and critics. 
This situation suggests that reform is needed. 
Changes in this country however are lagging far behind 
the progress acheived in some overseas countries. The two 
most notable examples of success in reform of secrecy and 
development of freedom of information are the Uni t 1ed 
Sta~es and Sweden. These two nations also provide warnings 
for would-be reformers in New Zealand. 
First the exercise takes a considerable amount of 
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time. In Sweden~ access to government documents is a 
tradition developed and improved since 1766. The United 
' \ ' 
States too has a similar tradition, but real progress 
towards greater access took 19 years of intensive study 
and research before workable Freedom of Information 
legislation was developed. 
The second cautionary note is that for reform to 
be effective, the executive needs to be either excluded 
from the proccess as in America, or have the need impr-
essed upon them for greater access to information. The 
Second United States Act was forced through in 1974 
despite President Ford's veto. 
These difficulties outlined above, surface again 
in the New Zealand attempts at reform. The practice of 
secrecy suits the purpose of a government, as they are 
able to shield themselves from undue embarassment and 
criticism. Therefore any attempt at significantly alt-
ering this situation is unlikely to have the sympathy 
of the executive. Cabinet dominates the legislature and 
can, if so inclined block any moves to reform official 
secrecy and the Official Secrets Act. 
Attempts at change in New Zealand in the past 
have been weak. Following the trial of Dr Sutch in 1975 
the Labour government promised to reform the Act. Des-
pite the disdain that the government and the Attorney-
-General Dr Finlay obviously had for the Act, the 
proposal for reform in 1975 was discarded because of lack 
of Parliamentary time. 
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Auckland Central M.P., Richard Prebble attempted 
to get freedom of information legislation passed when he 
sponsored t~o Private Members Bills in 1977 and 1979. 
Neither of these were concerned with actual reform of the 
Official Secrets Act, which is seen as the first step in 
any reform designed to promote freedom of information. 
The main prospect for reform in New Zealand comes 
with the Danks Committee on Official Information. The 
Committee has wide terms of reference, with the specific 
tasks of making recommendations for. reform of the Official 
Secrets Act, and of the criteria for the classification of 
information, with a view to the general aim of greater 
freedom of information. 
The Committee however has been criticised as being 
unbalanced, with five of the seven members being senior 
public servants. These men it is suggested are being asked 
to make a judgement in their own cause. 
The importance of the Danks Committee however, can 
only be fully measured by the content and recommendations 
of their report, as yet incomplete, and the actions, if any, 
that the government takes on these recommendations. 
Whatever the outcome of the Committee, there still 
remains a rising expectation, particularly among the educ-
ated and interested members of society, that we, as citizen~ 
are entitled to know what our government is doing. As yet 
this expectation does not represent the overwhelming or 
sustained pressure that is necessary to force a government 
into action. 
The Propositions. 
The observations above enable conclusions to be drawl 
as to the validity of the five original propositions. 
They were: 
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1. "That democratic theory regards information as 
important in a political system." In view of the discussion 
abov~ and in chapter one, this proposition is certainly 
valid. Basic freedoms in a democracy are often proclaimed. 
However the protection and full appreciation of those 
freedoms depend to a great extent on accessable and acc-
urate information. 
2. "That official secrecy is in some senses, 
contradictory to this theory." In essense this proposition 
is true, but there are many justifications for secrecy 
that cannot be dismissed lightly. The major problem in this 
respect is that there are no firm definitions between what 
. 
should be secret, and what should not. 
3. "That the Official Secrets Act by it's existance 
and operation, is undemocratic." The suggestion offered by 
this proposition is certainly valid. Although the Act is 
legal, it remains undemocratic. It is a major block to the 
freedom of information, and it's form and intent is 
contrary to traditional law and a citizens basic rights. 
The Act seems to refute the idea that democratic govern-
ments are obliged to treat people under their control, with 
fairness and equity. The Act could usurp this obligation and 
he used as a political weapon. 
4. "That reform is necessary to reconcile practice 
with democratic theory." This is a self-evident proposition 
which serves to demonstrate the difficulties involved in 
reform. Changes take time and they are not always success-
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-ful because of incomplete research or non-compliance 
by the execvtiv~ branch of government. 
5. "That because the Act is undemocratic and there 
is pressure for change, reform will occur." This is an 
assumption that can only be answered accuratly in the 
future. Reform has occured overseas, but in view of the 
problems in initiating effective reform, it remains to be 
seen if significant change will occur in New Zealand. 
However, if we suppose reform does come about, what 
imp~ct would it have? 
Towards Freedom of Information 
What contribution would a greater degree of 
freedom of information make to the fulfilment of the 
democratic ideal? One of the assumptions that the demo-
cratic model is based on is that governments are inher-
ently untrustworthy and therefore they must be limited 
and controlled. This control is ach~ved through the 
ballot box, through the courts and through public debate 
and criticism of the government. Greater freedom of infor-
mation would reinforce these methods of control. Criticism 
and lively and accurate debate about government activities 
help ensure that the administration is efficient, alert 
and receptive to public opinion. 
However.reform is difficult. Apart from the political 
and institutional impediments, there are several possible 
disadvantages or difficulties that may result from greater 
freedom of information. Purely mechanical illeffects are 
the high cost of making information available and the 
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logistical problems of organising and managing large 
quantities of information so that they can be made avail-
able. 
There is also the problem of protecting secrets or 
sensitive information, which, if disclosed, would damage 
the national interest. This information must have adequate 
legal protection. So too must the private affairs of 
citizens remain confidential. The problem here is perhaps, 
one of definition. What is private and secret, and what 
is public and open? 
Greater scrutiny, criticism and debate may enhance 
public control of government, but it may also serve to 
hinder and harass administration of government. Discuss-
ion may become less free and frank and bureaucrats could 
become timid in their policy advice. 
Surely the question here is one of compromise. 
There must be a movement to more open government, but 
the position of those in government must be respected. 
Whatever the path to freedom of information, the 
result is the most important. As it stands, the secrecy 
system is undemocratic. Freedom of information is necessary 
to the good health of democracy. The contradiction between 
secrecy and democratic theory needs to be removed. Whether 
or not this comes about, is the responsibility, not so 
much of the government, but of interested and concerned 
citizens. 
Books. 
---\ 
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THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT 1951 
1951, No. 77 
An Act to make better provision in respect of official secrets 
[6 December 1951 
1. Short Title-This Act may be cited as the Official Secrets 
Act 1951. 
2. ~terpretation-ln this Act, unless the context otherwise 
reqmres,-
"Document" incluw:s a part of a document: 
["Commissioned officer of Police"] includes any commis-
sioned officer of the Police Force of New Zealand; 
and also includes any person upon whom the powers 
of [a commissioned officer of Police] are for the pur-
poses of this Act conferred by the Governor-General 
by Order in Council: 
"Model" includes a design, pattern, or specimen: 
420 
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"Munitions of war" means any thing, material, or device, 
whether actual or proposed, intended or adapted for 
use in war, or capable of being adapted for use in 
war; and, for the purposes of this definition ( without 
prejudice to its generality), the expression "use in 
war" includes use in the production of munitions of 
war, and the expression "thing, material, or device" 
includes the whole or any part of any anns, ammuni-
tion, missile, implement, ship, vessel, aircraft, vehicle, 
tank, mine, engine, machinery, apparatus, or naval, 
military, or air force stores: 
"Office under His Majesty" includes any office or em-
ployment under the Government of New Zealand; 
and also includes any office or employment on, in, or 
under any board, commission, corporation, or body 
that is an agent of His Majesty or ari instrument of 
the Executive Government of New Zealand: 
"Prohibited place" means-
( a) ,Any work of defence belonging to or occupied 
or used by or on behalf of His Majesty or the Govern-
ment of any other country, including arsenals, naval, 
military, or air force establishments or stations, fac-
tories, dockyards, camps, ships, vessels, and aircraft; 
and also including telegraph, telephone, wireless, or 
signal stations or offices; and also including places 
used for the purpose of building, repairing, making, or 
storing any munitions of war or any sketches, plans, 
models, or documents relating thereto, or for the 
purpose of getting any metals, oil, or minerals of use 
in time of war: 
(b) Any place where any munitions of war, or any 
sketches, plans, models, or documents relating thereto 
are being made, repaired, gotten, or stored under 
contract with the Government of New Zealand or of 
any other country or with any person on behalf of 
any such Government, or otherwise on behalf of any 
such Government: 
( c) Any place which is for the time being de-
clared by the Governor-General by Order in Council 
· to be a prohibited place for the purposes of this Act: 
"Sketch" includes any mode of representing any place 
or thing, whether by photography or otherwise, and in 
particular includes a map: 
Any reference to His Majesty means His Majesty in right 
of New Zealand: 
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Any reference to a place belonging to His Majesty in-
cludes a place belonging to any Department of the 
Government of New Zealand or to ariy board, com-
mission, corporation, or body that is an agent -0f His 
Majesty or an instrument of the Executive Govern-
ment of New Zealand, whether the place is or is not 
actually vested in His Majesty:·. 
Expressions referring to communicating or receiving in-
clude any communicating or receiving, whether in 
whole or in part, and whether the sketch, plan, model, 
article, note, document, or infortnation itself or the 
substance, effect, or description thereof only is com-
municated or received; expressions referring to obtain-
ing or retaining any sketch, plan, model, article, note, 
or document include copying or causing to be copied 
the whole or any part thereof ( whether by photo-
graphy or otherwise) ; and expressions referring to the 
communication of any sketch, plan, model, article, 
note, or document include the transfer or transmission 
thereof. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, ss. 3, 12 (U.K.); Official 
Secrets Act 1920, ss. 9 (2), 10 (U.K.) 
"Commissioned officer of Police" : The references to a commissioned 
officer of Police were substituted for references to an Inspector of Police by 
1. 5 (2) of the Police Foree Act 1947 (as mbstituted bys. 2 (1) of the Police 
Force Amendment Act 1956). 
3. Spying-( 1) If f!.ny person for any purpose prejudicial to 
the safety or interests of the State-
(a) Approaches, inspects, passes over, or is in the neigh-
bourhood of, or enters any prohibited place; or 
{b) Makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is cal-
culated to be or might be or is intended to be directly 
or indirectly useful to an enemy; or 
(c) Obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates 
to any other person any secret official code word or 
password, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, 
or other document or information which · is cal-
culated to be or might be or is intended to be directly 
or indirectly useful to an enemy,-
he commits an offence against this Act and shall be liable 
on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding fourteen ·years, or, in the case of a company or 
corporation, to a fine not exceeding five thousand pounds. 
422 
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( 2) Any person charged with an offence against this section 
may, if the circumstances warrant such a finding, be found 
· guilty of any other offence against this Act. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 1 (1) (U.K.) 
4. Communications with foreign agents to be evidence of 
certain offences-( 1) In any proceedings against a person for 
an offence against section three of this Act, the fact that he has 
been in communication with, or attempted to communicate 
with, a foreign agent, whether within or outside New Zealand, 
shall be evidence that he has, for a purpose prejudicial to the 
safety or interests of the State, obtained or attempted to obtain 
information which is calculated to be or might be or is in-
tended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, but without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing provision,-
( a) A person shall, unless he proves the contrary, be deemed 
to have been in communication with a foreign agent 
if-
(i) He has, either within or outside New Zealand, 
visited the address of a foreign agent or consorted or 
associated with a foreign agent; or 
(ii) Either within or outside New Zealand, the 
name or address of or any other information regard-
ing a foreign agent has been found in his possession, 
or has been supplied by him to any other person, or 
has been obtained by him from any other person: 
(b) The expression "foreign agent" includes any person 
who is or has been or is reasonably suspected of 
being or having been employed by a foreign Power, 
either directly or indirectly, for the purpose of com-
mitting an act, either within or outside New Zealand, 
prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, 
or who has or is reasonably suspected of having, 
either within or outside New Zealand, committed 
or attempted to commit such an act in the interests 
of a foreign Power: 
(c) Any address, whether within or outside New Zealand, 
reasonably suspected of being an address used for 
the receipt of communications intended for a foreign 
agent, or any address at which a foreign agent re-
sides, or to which he resorts for the purpose of giving 
or receiving communications, or at which he carries 
on any business, shall be deemed to be the address 
Vol. 11 
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of a foreign agent, and communications addressed 
to such an address shall be deemed to be communi-
cations with a foreign agent. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1920, s. 2 (U.K.) 
5. Unlawful use of uniforms, forgery, personation, false 
documents, etc.-( 1) If any person, for the purpose of gaining 
admission, or of assisting any other person to gain admission, 
to a prohibited place, or for any other purpose prejudicial to 
the safety or interests of the State,-
( a) Uses or wears any naval, military, air force, police, or 
other official uniform, whether of New Zealand or 
of any other country, or any uniform so nearly re-
sembl~ng the same as to be calculated to deceive, or 
falsely represents himself to be a person who is or 
has been entitled to use or wear any such uniform; or 
(b) Orally, or in writing in any declaration or application, 
or in any document signed by him or on his behalf, 
knowingly makes or connives at the making of any 
false statement or any omission; or 
( c) Forges, alters, or tampers with any passport or any 
naval, military, air force, police, or official pass, 
permit, certificate, licence, or other document of a 
similar character, whether of New Zealand or of any 
other country ( in this section ref erred to as an 
official document), or uses or has in his possession 
any forged, altered, or irregular official document; 
or 
( d) Personates or falsely represents himself to be a person 
holding, or in the employment of a person holding, 
office under His Majesty or under the Government 
. of any country other than New Zealand, or to be or 
not to be a person to whom an official document or a 
secret official code word or password, whether of 
New Zealand or of any other country, has been duly 
issued or communicated, or, with intent to obtain an 
official document or any such secret official code 
word or password, whether for himself or for any 
other person, knowingly makes any false statement; 
or 
( e) Uses, or has in his possession or under his control any 
official die, seal, or stamp, whether of New Zealand 
or of any other country, or any die, seal, or stamp 
so nearly representing any such official die, seal, or 
stamp as to be calculated to deceive, or counterfeits 
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any such official die, seal, or stamp, or uses or has in 
his possession or under his control any such counter-
£ eited die, seal, or stamp,-
he commits an offence against this Act. 
( 2) If any person-
( a) Retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or in-
terests of the State any official document, whether 
or not completed or issued for use, when he has no 
right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to 
retain it, or fails to comply with any directions issued 
by lawful authority with regard to the return or 
disposal thereof; or 
(b) Allows any other person to have possession of any official 
document issued for his use alone, or communicates 
any . such secret official code word or password as 
aforesaid so issued, or has in his possession any official 
document or any such secret official code word or 
.password issued for the use of some person other than 
himself, or, on obtaining possession of any official 
document, whether by finding or otherwise, neglects 
or fails to restore it to the person or authority by 
whom or for whose use it was issued, or to a con-
stable; or · 
( c) Manufactures or sells, or has in his possession for sale, 
any such die, seal, or stamp, as aforesaid,-
he commits an offence against this Act. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1920, s. 1 (U.K.) 
6. Wrongful communication of information-(1) If any 
person, having in his possession or control any secret official 
code word or password, whether of New Zealand or of any 
other country, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, docu-
ment, or information which relates to or is used in a prohibited 
place or anything in a prohibited place, or which has been 
made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which has 
been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding 
office under His Majesty or under the Government of any 
other country, or which he has obtained or to which he 
has had access owing to his position as a person who holds 
or has held such an office, or as a person who holds or has 
held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty or on be-
half of the Government of any other co1,.mtry, or a contract 
the performance of which in whole or in part is carried out in 
a prohibited place, or as a person who is or has been employed 
under a person who holds or has held such an office or 
contract,-
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(a) Communicates the code word, password, sketch, plan, 
· · model, article, note, document, or information to 
any person, other than, a person to whom he is 
authorised to communicate it or a person to whom it 
is in the interest of the State his duty to communicate 
it; or 
(b) Uses the information in his possession in any manner, 
or for any purpose, prejudicial to the safety or in-
terests of the State; or 
( c) Retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or docu-
ment in his possession or control when he has no 
right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty 
to retain it, or fails to comply with any directions 
issued by lawful authority with regard to tht return 
or disposal thereof; or 
(d) Fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself 
as to endanger the saf,ety of, the sketch, plan, model, 
article, note, document, secret official code word or 
password, or information-
he commits an offence against this Act. 
(2) If any person, having in his possession or control any 
sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information 
which relates to munitions of war, whether of New Zealand 
or of any other country, communicates it, directly or indirectly, 
to any person in any manner, or for any purpose, prejudicial 
to the safety or interests of the State, he commits an offence 
against this Act. 
( 3) If any person receives any secret official code word or 
password, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, 
or information knowing or having reasonable ground to be-
lieve, at the time when he receives it, that the code word, 
password, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or 
information is communicated to him in contravention of this 
Act, he shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, unless 
he proves that the communication to him of the code word, 
password, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or 
information was contrary to his desire. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 2 (U .K.) 
7. Proof of purpose prejudicial to safety or interests of 
State-On a prosecution under this Act, if, from the circum-
stances of the case·, or the conduct of the accused person, or 
his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was 
a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, 
.it shall be deemed that his purpose was such a purpose unless 
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the contrary is proved, whether or not any particular act 
tending to show such a purpose is proved against him; and if 
any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or informa-
tion relating to or used in any prohibited place, or anything in 
a prohibited place, or any secret official code word or password 
is made, obtained, collected, recorded, published, or com-
municated by any person other than a person acting under 
lawful authority, it shall be deemed to have been made, ob-
tained, collected, recorded, published, or communicated for a 
purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State unless 
the contrary is proved. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 1 (2) (U.K.) 
8. lnterf ering with police or persons on guard-Every per-
son commits an offence against this Act who, in the vicinity of 
any prohibited place, obstructs, knowingly misleads, or other-
wise interferes with or impedes-· -
(a) Any constable; or 
(b) Any person engaged on guard, sentry, patrol, or other 
similar duty in relation to the prohibited place. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1920, s. 3 (U.K.) 
9. Harbouring spies-If any person-
( a) Knowingly harbours any person whom he knows, or has 
reasonable grounds for supposing, to be a person who 
is about to commit or who has committed an offence 
against this Act, or knowingly permits to meet or 
assemble in any premises in his occupation or under 
his control any such persons; or . 
(b) Having harboured any such person, or permitted to 
meet or assemble in any premises in his occupation 
or under his control any such persons, wilfully omits 
or ref uses to disclose to [a commissioned officer of 
Police] any information which it is in his power to 
give in relation to any such person,-
he commits an offence against this Act. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 7 ( U .K.) 
In para. (b) the reference to a commissioned officer of Police was substi-
tuted for a reference to an Inspector of Police by s. 5 (2) of the Police 
Force Act 1947 (as substituted by s. 2 ( 1) of the Police Force Amendment 
Act 1956). 
10. Attempts, incitements, etc.-Every person who attempts 
to commit an offence against this Act, or solicits or incites or 
endeavours to persuade another person to commit an offence 
against this Act, or aids or abets or does any act preparatory 
Vol. 11 Official Secrets Act 1951 
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11. Duty of giving information as to offences-( 1) Where 
the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that an offence against this Act has 
been committed and for believing that any person is able to 
furnish information as to the offence or suspected offence, he 
may apply to the Attorney-General for permission to exercise 
the powers conferred by this subsection and, if permission is 
granted, he may authorise [a commissioned officer of Police] 
to require the person believed to be able to furnish information 
to give any information in his power relating to the offence or 
suspected offence, and, if so required and on tender of his 
reasonable expenses, to attend at such reasonable time and 
place as may be specified by [the commissioned officer of 
Police]; and if a person required in pursuance of such an 
authorisation to give information, or to attend as aforesaid, 
fails to comply with any such requirement or knowingly gives 
false infortnation, he commits an offence against this Act. 
( 2) Where the Commissioner of Police has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the case is one of great emergency and 
that in the interest of the State immediate action is necessary, 
he may exercise the powers conferred by the last preceding 
subsection without applying for or being granted the permis-
sion of the Attorney-General, but if he does so he shall forth-
with report the circumstances to the Attorney-General. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1920, s. 6 (U.K.); Official Secrets 
Act 1939, s. 1 {U.K.) 
In 1ubs. ( 1) the references to a commissioned officer of Police were 
substituted for references to an Inspector of Police by s. 5 (2) of the Police 
Force Act 1947 (as substituted by s. 2 (1) of the Police Force Amendment 
Act 1956). 
12. Power to arrest-Any person who is found committing 
an offence against this Act, or who is reasonably suspected of 
having committed or of having attempted to commit or of 
being about to commit such an offence, may be arrested with-
out warrant. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 6 {U.K.) 
13. Search warrants-( 1) If a Justice of the Peace is satis-
fied on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that 
an offence against this Act has been or is about to be commit-
ted, he may grant a search warrant authorising any constable 
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named therein to enter at any time any premises or place speci-
fied in the warrant, by force if 1.ecessary, and to search the 
premises or place and every persc n found therein, and to seize 
any sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document, or any-
thing of a like nature, or anything which is evidence of an 
offence against this Act having been or being about to be com-
mitted, which he may ·find on the premises or place or on any 
such person, and with regard to or in connection with which 
he has reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence against 
this Act has been or is about to be committed. 
( 2) Where it appears to [a commissioned officer of Police] 
that the case is one of great emergency and that in the interest 
of the State immediate action is necessary, he may by a written 
order signed by him give to any constable the like authority as 
may be given by the warrant of a Justice under this section. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 9 (U.K.) 
In subs. (2) the reference to a coIImU!Sioned officer of Police was sub-
stituted for a reference to an Inspector of Police by s. 5 (2) of the Police 
Force Act 1947 (as substituted by a. 2 ( 1} of the Police Force Amendment 
Act 1956). 
14. Restriction on prosecution-A prosecution for an offence 
against this Act shall not be instituted except by or with the 
consent of the Attorney-General: 
Provided that a person charged with any such offence may 
be arrested, or a warrant for his arrest may be issued and 
executed, and any such person may be remanded in custody or 
on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of the Attorney-
General to the institution of a prosecution for the offence has 
not been obtained, but no further or other proceedings shall be 
taken until that consent has been obtained. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 8 (U.K.) 
15. Trial and punishment of offences-( 1) Every person 
who commits an offence against this Act for which no other 
punishment is provided shall be liable-
( a) On conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding seven years or to a fine not 
exceeding five hundred pounds, or to both, or, in 
the case of a company or corporation, to a fine not 
exceeding three thousand pounds; or 
. (b) On summary conviction to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding twelve months or to a fine not exceed-
ing two hundred pounds, or to both, or, in the case 
of a company or corporation, to a fine not exceeding 
one thousand pounds: 
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Provided that no offence shall be dealt with summarily 
except .with the consent of the Attorney-General. 
(2) For the purposes of the trial of any person for an offence 
against this Act the offence shall be deemed to have been 
committed either at the place in which it actually was com-
mitted or at any place within New Zealand in which the 
offender may be found. 
(3) In addition to and without prejudice to any powers 
which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public 
from any proceedings, if, in the course of proceedings before a 
Court against any person for an offence against this Act or the 
proceedings on appeal, application is made by the prosecution, 
on the ground that the publication of any evidence to be given 
or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings 
would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, that 
all or any portion of the public should be excluded during any 
part of the hearing, the Court may make an order to that 
effect, but the passing of sentence shall in any case take place 
in public. 
( 4) Where the person guilty of an offence against this Act 
is a company or corporation, every director and officer of the 
company or corporation shall be guilty of the like offence unless 
he proves th'at the act or omission constituting the offence took 
place without his knowledge or consent. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1920, s. 8 (U.K.) 
16. Extent of Act-( 1) This Act shall apply to every act 
or omission constituting an offence against this Act if it is done 
or made by any person in any part of New Zealand. 
( 2) This Act shall apply to every act or omission constituting 
an offence against this Act if it is done or made outside New 
Zealand in any of the following cases: 
(a) Where the offender at the time of the act or omission 
was a New Zealand citizen or a New Zealand pro-
tected person within the meaning of the British 
Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948, 
or a person holding office under His Majesty or 
owing allegiance to His Majesty: 
(b) Where any code word, password, sketch, plan, model, 
article, note, document, information, or other thing 
whatsoever in respect of which the offender is 
charged was obtained by him, or depends upon in-
formation obtained by him, while he was in New 
Zealand, or while he was a New Zealand citizen, or 
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· a New Zealand protected person, or a person holding 
office under His Majesty or owing allegiance to His 
Majesty. 
Cf. Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 10 (1) (U.K.); Official 
Secrets Act 1939, s. 12A (Canada) 
17. Application of Act to island territories and Western 
Samoa- ( 1 ) This Act shall be in force in the Cook Islands, 
the Tokelau Islands, and Western Samoa. 
(2) Repealed bys. 45 (1) of the Samoa Amendment Act 
1957. 
( 3) In this Act, except in this section, both in New Zealand 
and in the Cook Islands, the Tokelau Islands, and Western 
Samoa, the term "New Zealand" shall be construed as includ-
ing the Cook Islands, the Tokelau Islands, and Western Samoa, 
and every reference to the Government of New Zealand shall 
be construed as including the Government of the Cook Islands, 
the Government of the Tokelau Islands, and the Government 
of Western Samoa. 
( 4) All criminal jurisdiction conferred by this Act may be 
exercised by the High Court of the Cook Islands in the 
ordinary course of its criminal jurisdiction, or by the High 
Court of Western Samoa in the ordinary course of its criminal 
jurisdiction. For the purposes of this subsection, paragraph 
(a) of subsection one of section fifteen of this Act shall apply 
as if the words "on indictment" were omitted, and paragraph 
(b) of that subsection and the proviso to that subsection shall 
not apply. 
( 5) In the application of this Act to the Cook Islands, other 
than Niue,- 1 
(a) Every reference to the Governor-General or to the 
Attorney-General shall be construed as including the 
Resident Commissioner of Rarotonga: 
(b) Every reference to an Order in Council shall be con-
strued as including an order made by the Resident 
Commissioner of Rarotonga and publicly notified: 
( c) Every reference to a Justice of the Peace shall be con-
strued as including a Magistrate within the meaning 
of Part VI of the Cook Islands Act 1915 : 
( d) Every reference to the Commissioner of Police shall be 
construed as including the Chief Officer of Police at 
Rarotonga: 
( e) Every reference to [a commissioned officer of Police] 
shall be construed as including any officer of Police. 
(6) In the application of this Act to the Island of Niue-
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{a) Every reference to the Governor-General or to the 
Attorney-General shall be construed as including the 
· Resident Commissioner of Niue: 
(b) Every reference to an Order in Council shall be. con-
strued as including an order made by the Resident 
Commissioner of Niue and publicly notified: 
( c) Every reference to a Justice of the Peace shall be con-
strued as including a Magistrate within the meaning 
of Part VI of the Cook Islands Act 1915 : 
( d) Every reference to the Commissioner of Police shall be 
construed as including the Chief Officer of Police at 
Niue: 
{ e) Every reference to [a commissioned officer of Police] 
shall be construed as including any officer of Police. 
(7) In the application of this Act to the Tokelau Islands-
( a) Every reference to the Governor-General or to the 
Attorney-General shall be construed as including the 
Ac:lministrator of the Tokelau Islands: 
{b) Every reference to an Order in Council shall be con-
strued as including an order made by the Adminis-
trator of the Tokelau Islands. 
(8) In the application of this Act to Western Samoa-
( a) Every reference to the Governor-General or to the 
Attorney-General shall be construed as including the 
High Commissioner of Western Samoa: 
(b) Every reference to an Order in Council shall be con-
strued as including an order made by the High Com-
missioner of Western Samoa and published in the 
Western Samoa Gazette: 
{ c) Every reference to a Justice of the Peace shall be con-
strued as including a Judge or Commissioner of the 
High Court of Western Samoa: 
( d) Every reference to the Commissioner of Police shall be 
construed as including the Superintendent of Police 
or other principal officer of police in Western Samoa. 
In subss. (5) (e) and (6) (e) the reference to a commiasioned officer of 
Police was substituted in each case for a reference to an Inspector of Police 
by s. 5 (2) of the Police Force Act 1947 (as substituted by B. 2 (1) of the 
Police Force Amendment Act 1956). 
This Act is a reserved enactment-
In the Cook Islands other than Niue; see s. 39 (2) (a) of the Cook 
Islands Amendment Act 1957: 
In Niue; see s. 70 (2) (a) of the Cook Islands Amendment Act 1957: 
In Samoa; see s. 32 (2) (a) of the Samoa Amendment Act 1957. 
18. Repeal-The Official Secrets Act 1911 of the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom shall on the passing of this Act 
cease to have effect in New Zealand. 
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